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Introduction

The time has come for South Africa to embark on a
full-scale psychological war, instead of relying on films,
brochures and other government handouts. In this
unconventional propaganda offensive, no rules need
apply, no regulations would stand in our way. Only
objectives would count and the end would indeed justify
the means - any means .1
nce upon a time, according to several reliable sources in Washington,
th~re was a cabinet member of the Richard Nixon Administration who
used to drum vigorously on the table during meetings whenever the word
'½frica" was mentioned. Now, however, it is unlikely that the same individual
views Africa, especially South Africa, with scorn and derision, for the issue
of South Africa and its apartheid system has entered into the living rooms
of the American people. At long last the conscience of the American people
has been pricked and there is a growing awareness that apartheid is evil and
that the foreign policy of the U.S. government and the practices of U.S.
corporations are connected to the abhorrent situation in South Africa.
Undoubtedly, the major reason for this new awareness is the profound depth
and scale of resistance inside South Africa, including demonstrations which
between August 1984, and June, 1986 have seen over 1600 people shot and
killed, over 3000 wounded, and ovet 15,000 systematically arrested or
detained. The South Africa Institute of Race Relations recorded more than
3400 "unrest incidents" in the six months between August, 1985 and January,
1986. "South Africa is," as the prominent South African black leader, Rev.
Alan Boesack, has said, "in a state of civil war." One very conservative white
newspaper in South Africa underscored the depth and scale of the current
rebellion in South Africa when it commented on the seven thousand army
regulars brought into several townships to assist the police: "When the army

O

1

James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (New York:
Quartet Books, 1984), p.128.
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takes over, it is tantamount to a confession that the unruly parts of the country
are occupied enemy territory. It is an exercise not in law enforcement but in
reconquest. " 2
A related reason for the new interest in South Africa is the frequent protest
marches being held all over the U.S. by the black American-led Free South
Africa Movement. The U.S. marches, especially in Washington, D.C., but also
in many other cities, led to the arrest of more than 4000 people between
November 21, 1984, and the end of April, 1986. Many of those arrested were
prominent politicians, religious and labor leaders, and entertainers, such as
Detroit Mayor Coleman Young, United Auto Workers President Owen Beiber,
and singers Stevie Wonder and Harry Belafonte. Moreover, media star
involvement and the consistency of the demonstrations has kept the South
Africa question in the national consciousness. Radio and TV journalists have
devoted substantial time to in-depth interviews and special features.
n equally important source of the new visibility of South Africa and the
apartheid question in the U.S. is the divestment movement-the effort
to withdraw public monies from U.S. companies and banks linked to South
Africa, thus putting pressure on U.S. companies to terminate their activities
and support for South Africa. Between 1976 and June 1986, nineteen states,
at least 65 cities ranging from New York to East Lansing and from Chicago
to Seattle, ten counties, and the U.S. territory of the Virgin Islands took some
type of divestment action involving a total of over 6 billion dollars. In roughly
the same period, 84 colleges or universities throughout the country took
similar action (41 adopting total divestment), withdrawing approximately 470
million dollars.

A

But what is apartheid? Where did it come from? Why has apartheid become
so codified? Considering that other multi-racial societies too can be
characterized as having race relations problems, how did apartheid become
so systematic and institutionalized in South Africa?
Historical Background

"Apartheid" (prounounced apart-hate), which literally means "apartness" in
Afrikaans, is not just a system of racial discrimination. It is not merely
"segregation." Apartheid cannot be reduced to a series of unjust laws and a
situation wherein the black majority is denied its civil rights as guaranteed
by a constitutional framework. Nor can apartheid adequately be projected
with the statistics we can easily summarize:
• 87% of the land mass is reserved for whites;
13% of the land for blacks;
• 8.5 million black South Afrjcans denaturalized
since 1976;
• on the average, 136 black children in South Africa
die from hunger each day;
2

The Sunday Express Gohannesburg), January, 1985,
quoted in: Jennifer Davis, "South Africa: The Cyclone
is Coming," The Progressive, February, 1985, p. 20.
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• 3,372,900 black South Africans have been
removed from areas designated "white" between
~ "'10~ ~,..r
1960 and 1982;
~1'.~ew
• during 1983, there were 262,908 passlaw arrests
• L/ o. S"" ·~ ,16'\ ·~ l'1~ ~..,.
for violations of the passbook, which all Africans
~ ~ }S'O, GO'D SWt~
over 16 must carry and which specifies one's color
(African, coloured, Indian or White), the
p I,~ ~ f 00., 01)ll ~ ....ts
equivalent
of 720 arrests a day or 30 an hour,
fjt,_ pu- co.p1fo. \,JM~ lW,(....-c,, ';:
representing a 27.6% increase over 1982 or a
fl
. L
,s-.
.
'J.O '1' ~ off..', """'~ , ,
blM-t~
28. 75% increase over the 1981 figure of
160,000 arrests.
The printed word is limited. It cannot begin to convey it all. Facts, bare and
naked, have no intimacy. They do not breathe and bleed. The pain and anguish

of living under apartheid cannot be felt in the facts alone, for the apartheid
system is all this but more. It is a highly organized and sophisticated system
in which a minority population systematically strips and then willfully exploits
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a majority population. Novelist Nadine Gordimer's simple definition
of apartheid as "the sight of horror on the sun" describes it all eloquently
and clearly.
The seizure of black land is the heart of apartheid exploitation. Through the
Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 and subsequent codification, the Bantustans
(formerly called "native reserves") have been set up. Currently consisting of
more than 100 non-continguous patches of arid and non-productive territory,
the Bantustans are meant to be the homelands for the African majority
population. It is intended that all of these 100 areas (including Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei) will ultimately be independent states. Thus, Africans
will become foreigners in the 87% of South Africa - the mineral rich,
productive portion - which is white-ruled. Far from facilitating greater
independence for black people, the Bantustans entrap both the men, forced
to do migrant labor away from the homeland, and the women, compelled to
do subsistence agriculture or scrape up funds in other ways, in a mutually
reinforcing, debilitating cycle of dependency and poverty. Meanwhile, the
Bantustans provide the white sectors of the economy with a captive,
well-controlled source of cheap labor, while keeping the surplus population
(the u_n employed, the old, the sick, the children - called "superfluous
appendages" by the white officialdom) out of sight and out of mind. The
Bantustans per se are an act of violence. As a recent study done jointly by the
South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the Southern African Catholic
Bishops Conference (ACBC) described them:
Bantustans are characterized by mass unemployment; by pove~ty so desperate that the position of
the residents is wprse than that of the inhabitants
of any other part of Africa except perhaps the
'Sahel' countries. They are characterized by
outbreaks of diseases such as cholera, bubonic
plague and typhoid, and malnutrition so far
advanced that about a fifth or more of the children
die before the age of five .3
Apartheid is a system which predicates every facet of life on color. Being white
is the starting point and ending point for,everything in the political, economic
~nd social fabric of the society. There can be no suggestion of "power sharing"
amongst th~ different groups in South Africa, for the raw quintessence of the
apartheid system is to ensure white control in perpetuity. As Premier
Verwoerd said on January 25, 1963 in the South African House of Assembly:
Reduced to its simplest form the problem is
nothing else than this: We want to keep South
Africa white ... 'Keeping it white' can only mean
one thing, namely white domination, not
'leadership,' not 'guidance,' but 'control,'
'supremacy.' If we are agreed that the white man
should be able to continue to protect himself by
3

Relocations: The Churches' Report on Forced Removals. A
study done by the·South African Council of Churches
and the Sou them African Catholic Bishops Conference,
Johannesburg, 1984, p. 42.
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retaining white domination, we say that it can be
achieved by separate development. 4
In the beginning, even determining who and what was "white". was a major
problem. The original 1959 Population Registration Act stated that:
A white person means a person who in appearance
obviously is, or who is generally accepted as a
~ hite person but does not include a person who
although in appearance obviously a white person,
is generally accepted as a coloured person. 5
But from July 1959 to the end of 1966, there were 267,541 cases of doubt. The
definition was amended in 1967 by the Population Registration Amendment
Act No. 64:
A person shall be classified as White if his natural
parents have both been so classified. In the absence
of proof to that effect, his habits, education, speech
and deportment shall be taken into account as well
as how he is accepted at his place of ordinary
residence, place of employment, place where he
mixes socially with the public, and place where he
associates with members of his family. In addition
there are complicated presumptions deriving from
statements made in documents such as census
returns or birth registers. 6
Nonetheless, the confusion and illogic continues. For instance, a Chinese
born in South Africa is treated as Coloured or Asian and a Japanese born in
Asia is considered an honorary _white. The result is that the "political" or
governing function of the term "race" is what matters, with little attempt at
any scientific accuracy.
he apartheid system (so~etimes called by the South Afric~n governm~nt
"separate development' or more recently, "plural relations," "vertical
differentiation," or "plural democracy" or most recently, the "confederal
states system") is grounded in the bedrock foundations of South
Africa's formation as a state. The roots of the system go very deep. The
ideological and religious justifications of South Africa's apartheid system can
be traced to the initial arrival of the white settlers who came in 1652 with the
Dutch East India trading company to establish a refreshments station at the
Cape of Good Hope in route to East India. The December 13, 1652 diary entry
ofJan Van Riebeeck describe.s succinctly the Dutch attitude toward the people
who greeted them:
Today the hottentots (the Khoikhoi) came with

T
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Brian Bunting, "The Origins of Apartheid," quoted in:
Alex La Guma (ed.), Apartheid: Collected Writings on
South African Racism by South Africans. (New York:
International Publishers, 1971), p. 28.
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Albie Sachs, South Africa: The Violence of Apartheid
(London: International Defense and Aid Fund, 1969),

p.10.
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thousands of cattle and sheep close to our fort, so
that their cattle nearly mixed with ours. We feel
vexed to see so many fine head of cattle, and not
be able to buy to any considerable extent. If it had
been indeed allowed, we had opportunity today
to deprive them of 10,000 head, which, however,
if we obtain orders to that effect can be done at
any time, and even more conveniently, because
they will have greater confidence in us. With 150
men, 10,000 or 11,000 head of black cattle might
be obtained without danger of losing one man; and
many savages might be taken without resistance,
in order to be sent as slaves to India, as they still
always come to us unarmed.7
Over the centuries, the white settler population, with its superior weapons
and technology, grew and consolidated its powers through various brutal
wars of conquest against first, the KhoiKhoi and San peoples, then the Xhosa
speaking peoples and finally, the Ngunis (Zulus). The African populations
became a cheap labor source for white farmers and entrepreneurs.
In the 1830's, the descendents of the early Dutch settlers, now calling
themselves ''Afrikaaners" and viewing themselves as a chosen superior
people, moved northwards into the interior of South Africa . This northward
move, called the "Great Trek," is a significant point in South African history
because it was partly the Afrikaaners' attempt to avoid the British effort to
abolish slavery and lift the color ban. Meanwhile Afrikaaner theologians and
church leaders preached that they were "called upon by God" to achieve the
specific task of civilizing the non-whites they encountered. Thus, they could
assert- as many do to the present day-that their" calling" was evidence
of their racial superiority and of the predestined fact that blacks were intended
to be the "hewers of wood" and "drawers of water" while whites were
"to act as the guardian, master and spiritual leader of the black man."
The "Great Trek," comparable in so many respects to the westward movement
of the U.S. settlers, ultimately led to several decisive battles with the Zulu
people . Though the Zulus fought well, ultimately the Afrikaaners prevailed.
Afrikaaners still celebrate the December 10, 1938 conquest when they killed
3,000 Zulus as the Day of the Covenant, the day in which they pledged to
God that they would forever honor God's support of their campaign against
the "heathens and Kaffirs." Today, South African children-even some black
children - recite their equivalent of the U.S. pledge of allegiance every
Covenant Day:
Brothers and fellow countrymen, we stand here
before the Holy God of Heaven and Earth to make
a vow that, if He will be with us and protect us
and give the foe into our hands, we shall ever
celebrate the day and date as a Day of Thanksgiving
like the Sabbath in His honor. We shall enjoin our
children that they must take part with us in this,
B. Thomas (ed.), Journal oflan Van Riebeek, 1651-1655
(Capetown, 1911) vol. I, p. 112.

7 H.
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for a remembrance even for our posterity. For the
honor of God shall herein be glorified, and to Him
shall be given the fame and honor of the victory.
In the late 19th Century, during the time diamonds were discovered in 1867
and gold in 1887 and while European governments were scrambling all over
Africa for territory and resources, the British moved into South Africa. In
1877, the British annexed fne Transvaal in northern South Africa. A year later,
they began a series of wars against the Zulus to pacify them and assume
control of their lands. It was during this period that the competition over
mineral riches and tension over land and labor between the Afrikaaners (or
"Boers") and British colonialists intensified to armed conflict in 1880 to 1881,
which was known as the First Anglo-Boer War. Eighteen years later, hostilities
broke out again from 1899-1902, the Second Anglo-Boer War. The Second
Anglo-Boer War was fought on a more bitter level and involved the famous
winter internment of thousands of Afrikaaner women and children by the
British army. By the end of the war, approximately 25,000 women and children
had died in the British camps from exposure, disease, and starvation.
ne key factor united Britain and Boer: the desire to maintain the African
population as a source of cheap labor for the farms, mines, and industry.
In 1873, 18 year old Cecil Rhodes observed that "diamonds are found in all
ways by the caffre (sic) ... they have been able to find no bottom yet."
Another white man rejoiced that "it was a veritable tom tiddlers ground,
where the diggers could not only make a fortune but have it done for them
by niggers." 8 Hence, in 1910, few in the African community were surprised
when the British and Afrikaaners joined together to form the Union of South
Africa. In 1913, the Native Land Act was passed, closely followed by
amendments strengthening the already existing Masters and Servants Act.
Both laws were designed to alienate Africans from the land, to reduce African
cash-crop farming, and to facilitate a regular flow of cheap and unorganized
African labor onto white farms and mining sites.

0

In the early 1930's, the Transvaal leader of the Nationalist Party, J.C. Strijdom,
bluntly stated:
Our policy is that the Europeans must stand their
ground and must remain baas in South Africa. If
we reject the herrenvolk idea and accept the
principle that the white man cannot remain baas,
if the franchise is to be extended to the
non-Europeans, and if the non-Europeans are
given representation and the vote and the
non-Europeans are developed on the same basis
as the Europeans, how can the European remain
baas? .... Our view is that in every sphere the
European must retain the right to rule the country and
8

Alex Wilmot, The Life and Times of Sir Richard Southey
(Capetown, Maskew Miller, 1904), p. 241, quoted in:
Greg Lanning, Africa Undermined (New York, Penquin
Books, 1979), p. 34.
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to keep it a white man's country. 9 (Emphasis added)
Several years later, in 1936, the Native Land in Trust Act, passed by an all
white Parliament, divided the land: 86.3% for the whites; the remaining 13.7%
for the blacks. In 1948, the Nationalist Party was elected.
It followed logically that in its quest to protect and empower the herrenvolk,
the Boers would turn to Nazism as a model of strong government. So strong
was the Nazi influence upon the South African Nationalist Party stalwarts
that even when Nazism was being revealed at its ugliest, the Boers continued
to publicly identify with the Reichstag. In 1942, Jan Strijdom, who would
later become Prime Minister, heralded Nazism in a parliamentary debate:
German National Socialism strives for race purity.
That philosophy is certainly the nearest to our
National-Christian philosophy in South Afrka. 10

P. W. Botha at a military parade

in Pretoria.
Other laws, such as the Suppression of Communism Act, the 180 Day
Detention Act, and others, can be traced to the Nazi factor. The 1984
constitutional reform, which concentrated nearly all executive power in
Botha's new office of the Presidency, parallels Hitler's seizure of most executive
decision-making powers in the late 1930's as Germa~y faced more internal
and external crises and tensions.
9

Parliamentary Debate, 1949, quoted in: Sipo Mzimela,
Apartheid: South African Naziism (New York: Vantage
Press, 1983), p. 10.

10 lbid.
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y 1959, the Nationalist government had passed the Group Areas Act
making it illegal for people of different races to live in the same area, the
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Suppression of Communism Act,
and the Population Registration Act. This legislation controlled the black
population and prevented their superior numbers from overwhelming the
white minority. As the Afrikaaners stated in their history texts: it was in
general, legislation design~d to define the blacks' place and prevent
"swartgevaar" - the black peril.
·

B

In no single area was the intent of apartheid as clearly stated as in the field
of education for Africans. In 1954 Dr. Henrik Verwoerd, the principal architect
of apartheid, described the "facilitating" function which education would
provide within the schema of apartheid. Making a cogent statement with
far-reaching implications, he said:
My department's policy is that education should
stand with both feet in the reserves and have its
roots in the spirit and being of Bantu society. There
Bantu education must be able to give itself
complete expression and there it will be called
upon to perform its real service. The Bantu must
be guided to serve his own community in all
respects. There is no place for him in the European
community above the level of certain forms of
labour. Within his own community, however, all
doors are open .... Until now he has been
subjected to a school system which drew him away
from his own community and misled him by
showing him the green pastures of European
society in which he was not allowed to graze.
(Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, Senate,
June 7, 1954)
There are many more dimensions to the historical development of apartheid
South Africa. One dimension, which is increasingly critical to the unfolding
pageant in South Africa, is the white population of South Africa and its
attitudes. There are now approximately 4,700,000 whites in South Africa. They
are not an undifferentiated, homogeneous mass. Divided largely along
linguistic lines into the Afrikaans-speaking Dutch descendents of
approximately 2,800,000, and the English-speaking group, mostly British, of
1,880,000, there are also Germans, Portuguese, Greeks, Italians, French, and
recently, a growing number of Polish refugees. Additionally, there is a Jewish
community of 117,000 which constitutes about 3% of the white population.
Historically, this population has been united, despite certain deep conflicts
like the Boer War and the dissent of tiny but peristent groups of whites, in
its posture of white "baasskap" ("bossdom" domination) over the majority
black population. It has been united as well in the sublimely indifferent
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attitude toward the police state terror and degradation intrinsic to the
apartheid state. Many whites have simply enjoyed their high standard of
living and managed a serene indifference to all that is transpiring everywhere
around them. Like many Germans during the rise of Nazism, many whites
in South Africa have been convinced or convinced themselves that they have
no idea of what's going on.
Whites Against Apartheid
oday, a new juncture has been reached in South Africa. The white terrain
is no longer the same. Cracks and faults are steadily developing. A small
but prophetic group of theologians inside the Afrikaaner's dominant
Dutch Reformed Church, influenced by some remarkable figures like the Rev.
Beyers Naude, head of the South African Council of Churches, has recently
declared apartheid to be heresy and resistance against apartheid, including
armed struggle, to be theologically justifiable. This has led to a sharpened
crisis inside the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church)
about whether the Bible indeed justified the existence of apartheid. In this
way, some Dutch Reformed members join a swelling number of white and
black church people, from Catholics and Protestants to Muslims and Jews,
from Bishops like Catholic Archbishop Hurley to laypeople like community
leaqer Mohamed Allie Razak (shot and killed May 9, 1985 while in police
custody), who are more and more involved in the struggle for total change.
This fissure inside the white community is very impo.r tant because most
Afrikaaners rely very heavily upon their religious conviction that God
sanctions all that they do.

T

There is a small, but steadily growing stream of white draft resisters who are
either refusing service and fleeing the country or going absent during their
required military stints. Recently, South African intelligence documents
captured in Namibia showed the South African Defense Force (SADF)
admitting to a major morale problem amongst its troops in Namibia.
The South African white business community is showing that it is not as
monolithic as it has appeared in the past. There are clearly a growing number
of mining and industrial leaders who want to make substantive changes in
apartheid, for example, giving black unions the right to strike and bargain
collectively in order to maximize their flexibility for profit-making within a
free enterprise system. This is a group who would see doing away with blatant
racist practices in order to assure that the basic mechanisms of the free market
system are not threatened by the current movement for change.
Clearly, there is a prophetic minority - but growing - group of whites,
many of them young, who in the unions, churches and universities are openly
and totally identifying themselves with the black struggle for freedom. The
underground structures of the banned African National Congress (ANC) have
membership from all of South African's population groups. Significant
numbers of white cadre from the ANC have been imprisoned and tortured
through the years. The funeral of trade unionist Neil Aggett, who died in
detention in February 1982, attended by thousands of black workers from all
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over South Africa, symbolized the new visage which some are putting forward
. 11
in South Afnca.

Pro-Apartheid Whites
t the same time then~ is an equally significant hardening of attitudes and
positions taking plaQe within the .white community. The Afrikaaner's
Conservative Party, a more right-leaning split-off from the ruling Nationalist
Party, is growing in numbers. So too is the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP).
As well, both old and new vigilante groups, panicked by the reform initiatives
taken by the Botha administration (e.g., the ending of the prohibition against
mixed marriages) and by the growing mass movement inside the black
community, are becoming active throughout the country. On May 5, 1984,
the Afrikaaner Volkswag or Sentinels of the People, was born. Committed to
alerting the Afrikaaner nation to the new threat to their survival, the 7,000
people who participated in the founding ceremonies and oathings believed
themselves to be representative of the tough minority who stood tall and firm
while "the soft element talked peace and compromise." 12

A

In the Spring of 1986, a more militantly right wing and racist group, the
Afrikaaner Resistance Movement, or Afrikaanse Weerstand Beweging (AWB)
emerged in South Africa. The AWB consciously assumed as its symbol a
three-legged version of the Nazi swastika.
In short, dramatically different options are rapidly being taken up within the
white community as the curtain of "serene unawareness" is being ripped
open. It is even conceivable that at the end of this process there may lie a
totally polarized white South Africa.

The History of Black Resistance
he pivotal strand in the South African fabric, however, is the struggle
which the African people have waged throughout the unfolding of the
apartheid system. Repeated generations of Africans resisted: first, they fought
the encroachment of white settlers and their appropriation of African lands;
second, they fought against the growth of the apartheid state itself. For
instance, in the late 1890's, a young Zulu chief, Bembatha, protesting the
imposition of an increased hut tax, led an unsuccessful struggle against
extremely well-armed and modernized British colonial army contingents. On
March 21, 1960, at Sharpeville and Langa townships, while hundreds of
peaceful demonstrators protested the passbook law, the South African police
opened fire and killed 67 demonstrators and wounded hundreds more. On
June 16, 1976, thousands of African school children marched through streets
throughout South Africa protesting apartheid education. In the days and
weeks which followed, South African police and constables, acting on the
highest orders, responded by killing approximately 1,000 of the young
protesters (500 were shot in the back as they fled), wounding and arresting

T
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North, Freedom Rising: Life Under Apartheid
(New York: Macmillan, 1985), p. 308.

12 Allister

Sparks, "Hard-Liners Oppose South
African Reforms, New Afrikaaner Society Formed,"
The Washington Post, May 6, 1984; p. 22.
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thousands more. As the South African poet Dennis Brutus,movingly stated:
There was a girl
eight years old, they say
her hair in spiky braids
her innocent fist raised in imitation
Afterwards, there was a mass of red
some torn pieces of meat
and bright rags fluttering;
a girl in a print dress, once, they say.
("There was a Girl" by Dennis Brutus)
Those massacres, as with other situations of ·revolt against colonial rule and
oppressive conditions, fueled the flames rather than stilled the ~_resistance.
The resistance inside South Africa today is cut from the same fabric. In late
October 1984, 7,000 troops surrounded Sebokeng, a model township. For ten
hours the troops and police conducted the most intense_house-to-house raids
South Africa had even seen. Hundreds of people were loaded into trucks or
given orange armbands to show that they had been interrogated and their
fingerprints had been entered into the computers. Beginning November 5,
1984, over one million black workers in and around Johanne.s burg collectively
responded to the joint army-police raids by staging a two day "stay-away"
work stoppage.
For several days beginning in late February 1985, thousands of stone-throwing
residents of Crossroads, (an African squatter camp outside Capetown), battled
police and riot squads attempting to resettle them to remote bantustans. 13
Crossroads had long been a citadel of resistance but February's battle was the
mo.s t damaging. When the battle was over, eighteen people had been killed,
250 were wounded, dozens of police vehicles were burned, and 26 police
were injured. But the residents of Crossroads were not removed. In short,
the batons, dum-dum bullets, and tear gas at Soweto and Sharpeville, the
1977 and 1982 assassinations in jail cells of black leader Steve Biko and white
trade unionist Neil Aggett, the 1960 and 1977 bannings of legitimate popular
people's organizations and institutions like the African National Congress
(ANC) and the Christian Institute, have served to mobilize wave upon wave
of new recruits into the resistance struggle.
There are many more stories of remarkable heroism and strength in Sou th
Africa's histoire d'resistance. The thousands of people who today march the
streets, boycott the schools, organize the strikes, and quietly stalk South
African police and military are picking up a gauntlet left for them by thousands
of resisters with a vision: from Bembatha of the 1890's to Bram Fischer and
more recently to Nelson Mandela.
13

"Something Burning Inside," Time, March 4, 1985, p. 37.
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South Africa's
Use of Violence

Sometimes you have to do it to the children to make the
adults talk. There was a 12-year-old boy. We wanted to
know what was going on. We wanted his mother to talk,
so we tied him up like a chicken with his wrists up behind
his back, strapped to his ankles. Then we played water
polo with him, put him in this dam and pushed him
about, let him kick. Every so often we took him out. He
wouldn't cry. He just wet himself. The mother didn't tell
us anything. In the end we just left him in the water
and he drowned. (Trevor Edwards, ''A British Merce-·
nary on Operations for the South African Army in
Angola." Guardian 29:1, 1981)
outh Africa is a violent society. One facet of its violence is derived from
the deep structural inequities and repression of the apartheid system.
It is the upheaval of people's lives that emanates from situations like those
identified in a recent Carnegie Endowment financed study entitled "The
Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty in Southern Africa." 14 Amongst the
study's findings were the following:
a) the migratory labor system destroys family life.
1/3 of the migrant male workers interviewed
from several villages spend only one month a
year with their families;
b) some black rural areas had only one doctor to
every 174,999 people;
c) the number of people made destitute by
landlessness and unemployment had increased

S

14 Camegie

Endowment, Second Carnegie Inquiry Into
Poverty In Sou them Africa. Unpublished conference
papers edited by Professor Francis Wilson, University
of Capetown, Capetown, South Africa, 1984.
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between 1960 and 1980 from 4. 9 million to 8. 9
million;
d) on white-owned farms, black laborers earned
as little as $10.00 a month and 63% of the men
were underweight.
Thus one can assert, especially from the perspective of those subject to the
apartheid system's various institutions and vagaries, that apartheid itself is
an act of violence to the South African people.
But there is another face to the generalized ambience of violence in South
Africa. It is the violence of a totally militarized society. Violence is a result of
"the total strategy" -an all-out-war mentality which permeates every state
structure in South Africa -intended to combat the white man's replacement
by a black majority government.
Drafted shortly after the 1976 Soweto uprising in a Defense Department' White

Paper on National Security, "the total strategy" is a plan to address the perceived
multi-dimensional offensive against South Africa's minority white
government. This offensive is led, according to the analysis, by the Soviet
Union, acting with such unlikely allies as the World Council of Churches, the
U.S. Conference of Mayors, the Congressional Black'Caucus, TransAfrica, the
American Friends Service Committee, and the Washington Office on Africa,
to name a few. The goal of the offensive is identified as "nothing less than
the political and moral subversion of the white man and his replacement by
a majority government. The appropriate response, therefore, is that the entire
population, not just the security forces, sees the defense of the Republic of
South Africa as its responsibility."
Thus, it is not accidental that the semi-secret State Security Council (SSC),
chaired and dominated by President Botha, staffed by military officers, today
is the most powerful organ of government and is the result of Botha's
"reforms."
tis a state-fostered violence that we see today in South Africa. The violence
of containment and intimidation brought about by new laws like the 1982
Internal Security Act (which, among other things, makes it an offense
punishable by up to 25 years imprisonment to "advocate, advise or encourage
any person or action which might cause feelings of hostility between different
population groups") is a violence sanctioned by the specific South
African-b'orne doctrine of national security.

I

Violence manifests itself as well in the $1. 72 million dollars per day which
the South African Defense Force (SADF) expends today in Namibia. The
violence also manifests itself in the reckless, nearly bi-weekly destabilization
raids and actions which South Africa and its surrogate forces, UNITA (National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola and the MNR (National
Resistance Movement) in Mozambique, conduct upon the neighboring
countries of Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Zambia. The raids
include: the May 4, 1978 Cassinga, Angola invasion (800 women and children
killed); the January 31, 1981 Matola, Mozambique raid on an ANC home (13
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people killed); the May 23, 1982 attack on Matola and the bombing of Maputo
factories (5 Mozambican citizens killed); the December 9, 1982 invasion of
Maseru, Lesotho (42 South African refugees and Lesotho citizens killed); the
June 14, 1985 invasion of Gaborone, Botswana (16 people killed, one a six
year old girl); and the May 19, 1986 invasions of Zambia, Botswana, and
Zimbabwe. In Angola alone, the damage done by South African invasions
and sabotage of Angolan industrial installations (e.g., the June, 1985
attempted sabotage of Gulf Oil's facilities in Cabinda, Angola) since 1975 is
conservatively estimated at $10 billion. In its war against its neighbors, called
the "second front" by the South African government, South Africa since 1980
has killed more than 100,000 people and made one million more homeless.
It is estimated that an additional 100,000 have died in Mozambique and
southern Angola as the result of famine caused by the war. Lastly, the
systematic financial, logistical and arms support South Africa gives to UNITA
in Angola and to the MNR in Mozambique to destroy their citizenry and
infrastructure is a part of the South African ambience of violence. 15
The violence is in everyday life, in the lives of blacks and whites. It is in the
fund raising braes, and sundowners (barbecue parties) for "the boys at the
front." It is in the tank and cannon shaped pastries and cakes to be found
in the shops. And, it is in the fact that the defense budget has increased over
1000% in recent years and that now men between sixteen and 60 can be
drafted. On a 1982 trip into South Africa, the author once saw white, teen-aged
boys gleefully doing target practice with automatic rifles at water buckets
being carried on the heads of young African girls walking 100 yards away.
In recent years, there has been a marked growth in random savage attacks
15Joseph

Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front (New York:
Viking Penquin, 1986), p. 1.
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on black people by young white men. In Klerksdorp in the Transvaal, in late
1984, four white men, including two AWOL soldiers, accused a 21 year old
black woman of stealing the car she was driviryg. They stripped and beat the
woman, then shoved her body into the trunk of the car and set it ablaze. In
another instance, two soldiers shot a young black woman, then drove their
car over her head. The main perpetrator was sentenced to six years in jail.
The other was given five strokes of the cane. "The judge found' extenuating
circumstances' because both men were drunk. " 16
In the last twenty-one months, most of the approximately 1600 African deaths
have occurred at the hands of the South African police or South African army.
But another type of violence, dubbed "black on black violence" by the press,
stems from the awareness of many blacks that black officials appointed by
the South African government are collaborators with that government. In the
case of informants, blacks are seen as exceptionally dangerous because the
information they provide to the white government is often more revealing
and critical than that provided by white informants. This hostility to
collaborators explains why it is so often black policemen who have died as a
result of over 400 attacks on policemen. It is also blacks who are killed in the
inter-ethnic rivalries so long systematically encouraged by the police, the
white government and by the apartheid system.
ven whites feel the violence. A Los Angeles Times correspondent found that
South Africa has a very high rate of family killings. During June
E
1983-December 1984, at least 102 members of white families were shot and
killed by husbands and fathers who often subsequently killed themselves.
"The motive was often sexual but in some cases involved fear that the family
had 'no future.",1 7
It is only logical since South Africa is a society where guns of every genre

and make are prevalant. Whether it is a bra pistol or an Israeli-made Uzi
machine gun, most whites have multiple weapons. More than two million
guns are licensed to South African whites. 18 Generally, blacks are not
permitted to have gun licenses.
Weapons, therefore, are big business in South Africa. In 1984, the Armaments
Supplies Corporation (ARMSCOR), a state owned company which is the
third largest industrial enterprise in the country, sought to export
approximately $150 million worth of "combat-tested" arms merchandise. The
shipment was to include guns ranging from a South African manufacturer's
"midnight special," specially geared for markets like that of the U.S. black
"inner-city," to a 155 millimeter field howitzer reportedly capable of firing a
nuclear bullet and/or carrying nerve gas. The production of arms in South
Africa involves, other than ARMSCOR's eight subsidiaries and fifteen
factories, 50 main contracting companies, 400 more companies supplying
components, and another 1000 companies selling related items to ARMSCOR.
It also involves_an extensive advertising and marketing campaign. "This is

South Africa's Use of Violence

17

ARMSCOR" and "SALVO" are two titles of numerous magazines and
brochures saturating Western markets with claims of the "combat-proven
reliability'' of South African-made weaponry. ARMSCOR advertisements can
be found in various U.S. publications like Soldiers of Fortune, fone's, and the

International Defense Review.
South Africa participate,s in most of the international weapons, military or
police expositions. An 'Israeli stated that it was at such a conference in the
late 1960's where the Israeli-made machine gun, the Uzi, was introduced to
South Africa and its then ally, Rhodesia, as "the Ruzi." In 1982, South Africa,
until its expulsion, was a surprise exhibitor at the Defendory Exposition in
Greece. A South African delegation arrived in search of police hardware at
the Detroit, -Michigan International Association of Police Chiefs Convention
on October 3, 1983. More predictably, in 1984, South Africa showed up at the
International Air Show in Chile, only months after organizing its own grandstanding air show in the Transvaal.
In recent years, the amount of money that the South African government
spends on weapons and military equipment has increased geometrically. In
1966, South Africa spent$35 million on armaments. 19 By 1980, this figure had
increased to about $2 billion.
As was the case during World War II, some foreign companies, including
Westinghouse, General Motors, Siemens, and Leyland, are presently reaping
profit return rates of 12-15% based on their sale of computers, electronic
components, and motor vehicles to the South African military police. In 1978,
a secret memorandum from General Motors in South Africa revealed GM's
posture that a refusal to supply vehicles to the South African military could
lead to "a loss of government business thereby threatening the company's
viability. " 20
South Africa's continuing illegal occupation of Namibia, or Southwest Africa,
is an example of the application of the brutality and structural violence which
characterizes the apartheid state. South Africa took control of Namibia in 1915
after Germany's defeat in WWI. From 1919 until the establishment of the
United Nations in 1945, South Africa administered Namibia as a mandate
under the League of Nations. In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly
terminated South Africa's control of Namibia and placed it under direct U. N.
control. In 1969, the U.N. Security Council endorsed this decision and termed
South Africa's continued presence in Namibia "illegal." The International
Court of Justice rendered it illegal in 1971. Throughout this entire period,
South Africa defiantly remained in Southwest Africa, created its own mock
state apparatus, and increased the size and scope of its military presence. At
the same time, the Southwest African People's Organization, SWAPO,
founded in 1960 and committed to founding a genuinely independent nation,
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continued mobilizing inside the country, beginning with peaceful petitioning
and protests to adopting armed struggle in 1966. The Namibian Council of
Churches became deE:ply committed to the struggle for Namibia's
independence. Every move made by SWAPO or by other nationalist forces
in Namibia has been countered by South Africa by bringing in more troops
and/or further entrenching itself politically. For example, in May 1979, South
Africa set up the National Sovereign Assembly and the Council of Ministers
in Namibia which are answerable to an Administrator General appointed by
the Pretoria government.
Presently in Namibia there are over 100,000 troops or one soldier for every
six Namibian adults. There are 80,000 troops under South African Defense
Forces (SADF) control. There are 10,500 police. Both forces have reserves.
There are also various mercenary and vigilante groups or "white te~~ror"
groups such as Blankswa. There are guard forces of private companies. In
between the state's armed forces and the private armies, are South Africa's
clandestine units like the Koevoet ("crowbar") and 32 battalions famous for
their torture techniques. Lastly, there is a mushrooming of white command
and militia units both in towns and on farms who receive their arms and
training from the SADE
The growing militarization of South Africa and its presence in Namibia is not
merely the result of internal developments. It is also the product of specific
historical and global dynamics. One dynamic is that historically, "the west"
has viewed South Africa (in addition to Israel and the Philippines) as regional
police and as an outpost of the "Free World." In 1949, the British government
suggested to other Atlantic Pact members that South Africa was a kind of
transit center and support base and that "Malan [the South African
Prime Minister] should be convinced that South Africa's frontier was the
Middle East!" 21

The Impact of the U.S.
n November 1950, according to a recently declassified U.S. Defense
Department Document, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the
Secretary of Defense that: "Based upon current United States war plans,
including logistic requirements and support thereof, the ability of the Union
of South Africa to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of
which it is a part is important to the security of the United States. " 22 Today,
the Reagan Administration argues that the apartheid government is a "friendly
country." A few weeks after taking office in 1981, Ronald Reagan, citing
historically inaccurate information, said in a television interview:
As long as there's a sincere and honest effort being
made, based on our own experience in our own land,
it would seem to me that we should be trying to

I

21 Stanley

Uys, "Letting Out Past Secrets," Rand Daily
Mail, February 5, 1983, p. 7.
22Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, J.C.S. 2121/2, November 7, 1950,
cited in: Kevin Danaher, The Political Economy of U.S.
Policy Toward South Africa (Boulder: Westview Press,
1985), p. 68.
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be helpful. Can we abandon a country that has
stood beside us in every war we've ever fought, a
country that strategically is essential to the free
world? It has production of minerals we all must
havr and so forth . . . . if we're going to negotiate
with the Russians ... surely we can keep the door
open and continue to negotiate with a friendly
nation like South Africa . 23 (Emphasis added)
The current militarization of South Africa is the product of that relatively new
"Free World" thinking, especially in the U.S., which argues that a war with
the Soviet Union over global mineral resources is eminent and that, given the
history of insurgent conflict, racial and tribal unrest in the Southern Africa
region, it is imperative to expand "security" in the region. Therefore, one
must overlook the mild excesses of apartheid in order to preserve the alliance

United Democratic
Front demonstration.
)

with South Africa and to safeguard the southern oceans and regional sources
of manganese, uranium, chrome, gold, diamonds, and other mineral
resources. As the former Secretary of State Alexander Haig lamented to Time
in 1981:
The escalating setbacks to our interests abroad,
increasing lawlessness and terrorism, and the
23

Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Challenges Visit by Top
Military Men from South Africa," New York Times,
March 15, 1981, p.11.
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so-called wars of national liberation are putting in
jeopardy our ability to influence world events ...
and to assure access to raw materials. 24
The entire plan is well summarized in a May 1981 memorandum from Chester
Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, to Secretary of State Haig
labelled "Talking Points." The purpose of the memorandum was to brief Haig
for an upcoming meeting with then South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha.
Crocker noted:
We will not allow others to dictate what our
relationship with South Africa will be as evidenced
by our recent veto of sanctions. But just as we
recognize your permanent stake in the future of
Southern Africa, so you must recognize our ~permanent interest in Africa as a whole. We must
consider these interests in our Sou them Africa
policy and expect you will take them into account in
your dealings with us. This will require restraint and
good will by all parties. We cannot consent to act
as a smokescreen for actions which excite the fears
of other states in the region, and encourage
impractical, emotional responses to regional
problems. Although we may continue to differ on
apartheid, and cannot condone a system of
institutionalized racial differentiation, we can
cooperate with a society undergoing constructive
change. Your government's explicit commitment in this
direction will enable us to work with you. You must
help to make this approach credible. You also
should recognize that this period represents your
best shot, a rare opportunity because of our mandate
and our desire to turn a new leaf in bilateral
relations. 25 (Emphasis added)
he U.S. government, especially the Reagan Administration and U.S.
multi-national corporations, has not allowed the dangerous "others," like
the United Nations General Assembly, the Organization of African Unity, The
World Council of Churches, The Catholic Bishops Conference, Sweden,
Finland, India, and Italy, to stand in its way. Today, total U.S. financial
involvement in South Africa is estimated at $14 billion dollars and the U.S.
is South Africa's largest trading partner. 26
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As of June 1983, there was a minimum of $3. 9 billion worth of outstanding
loans to South African entities that U.S. banks had partially provided.
Continental Illinois Bank, for example, participated in at least two 1975 loans
to the South African Iron and Steel Industry (ISCOR) valued af $150 million. 27
ISCOR has in turn exported 550,000 tons of steel annually to the U.S. 28
Therefore, a large mi9west bank, using the deposits of many present and
former steel workers, made loans to South Africa enabling it to export more
steel to the U.S., possibly hastening the closing of midwestern U.S. steel
companies.
In addition, since 1981, the U.S. has trained various members of the South
African C_o ast Guard and increased the cooperation between U.S. and South
African military police and intelligence personnel. For example, in 1982, South
African police participated in a police-media training program in Chicago.
Cooperation between the U.S. and South African intelligence apparatuses is
at an all time high, but details are little known. An article in the New York
Times pointed out that the South Africans give U.S. intelligence and
surveillance planes landing facilities and in return "the U.S. provides South
Africa with intelligence on black governments and organizations." 29 In
another sphere, the Reagan administration has relaxed the U.N. arms embargo
against South Africa through the 1981 sales of 2,500 electronic shock batons
to private buyers for crowd control in South Africa, the 1982 sale of six turbo
jets to the South African Air Force, and the sales of $500,000 worth of
nonmilitary arms and ammunition and $28.3 million worth of "dual-use"
military equipment and technology to the government in the past four years.
A recent United Nations study points out that despite the fact that the U.S.
is a signatory nation to the U.N. Arms Embargo passed by the U.N. Security
Council in 1977 and despite at least three federal agencies with the potential
to enforce the embargo (State Department, Firearms and Tobacco Agency,
Customs Service), numerous illegal operations like the use of U.S.-made Colt
and Browning automatic weapons at commercial "anti-terrorist" training
centers in South Africa take place openly. 30 The study further noted that
during 1980-1982, $706 million worth of commercial or civilian aircraft and
related parts, all of which could be easily converted to military usage were
exported to South Africa. The study also reported that Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company distributes a directory locally in South Africa which offers
Goodyear "products serving commercial, military and private aviation." 31
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Finally, with the green light of the Reagan administration, U.S. companies
supply over 75% of all the computers and related hardware sold in South
Africa and control 40% of the South African oil products market. Many
companies openly acknowledge that they sell oil to the South African military
and police or, as is the case with IBM, that they have assisted in computerizing
the shipment of ammunition to the South African military and police. 32 South
Africa has become the third largest recipient of U.S. nuclear exports and
expertise with regular exchanges taking place between U.S. and South African
nuclear technicians. The Washington Post on January 20, 1985 indicated that
at least forty American atomic reactor operators, many of them lured to South
Africa with tax free $100,000 a year salaries, were working in South Africa,
possibly violating U.S. nuclear nonproliferation laws. It is not just that South
Africa has developed, according to the United Nations Center Against
Apartheid, a dozen or more nuclear weapons, but more significantly that the
U.S. embrace of South Africa has facilitated, almost singlehandedly, the
development of the biggest modern weapon of them all: South Africa's
apar.t heid system.

32Thomas

Conrad, Automating Apartheid: U.S. Computer
Exports to South Africa and the Arms Embargo

(Philadelphia: NARMIC/American Friends Service
Committee, 1982), p. 42.
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. The History
of the U.S.
in South Africa

ut there is more to the story of the United States-South Africa axis.
not simply that U.S. banks are making loans to South Africa and that its
B
economy by its very nature must have massive infusions of capital from

It is

overseas. It is not simply the outgoingness and good will of U.S. corporations
(promoting implementation from Johannesburg to Pretoria of the affirmative
action and union recognition programs called the Sullivan Principles while
spending millions combating similar programs in the U.S.) that has created
the close partnership which Pretoria has with the U.S. The current closeness
is a .result of the history of U.S. involvement in sub-Saharan Africa.
It is a common and erroneous belief that the story of U.S. involvement with
South Africa begins after World War II when many European economies were
shattered and U.S. economy and its multi-national corporations exploded.
Certainly, it is true that U.S. direct investment in South Africa began
snowballing after WWII and went from $140 million in 1950 to $750 million
in 1970 to the 1983 figure of 2.31 billion. 33 And certainly it is true that during
1960-1970, the majority of U.S. corporations began expanding their operations
into sub-Saharan Africa, mostly into the Republic of South Africa.

But, in fact, the U.S. has had deep historical ties to both South Africa and to
the system of apartheid. As early as the 1790's, American whaling ships were
to be found all along the coasts of Southern Africa. 34 American whalers
assisted the Dutch East India Co. in investigating and claiming the coast of
33 Lawrence

Litvak, South Africa: Foreign Investment and
Apartheid (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies,
1978), p. 44.

34

Alan Booth, '~merican Whalers in South African
Waters," South African Journal of Economics, December
4, 1964, p. 278.
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Namibia. In 1796, according to historian Alan Booth, there was even an initial
and tentative proposal for American colonization of South Africa. 35
hroughout the first half of the nineteenth century, American commercial
interests were active in South Africa. American miners explored
Namibia for gold, silver, and diamonds in the 1850's and 1860's. A business
acquaintance of President Ulysses Grant, Mr. Bedee, was actively seeking
concessions from the Cape Government for mining. By 1896, half or more of
, the engineers in South Africa's mines were from the U.S. Also, Congregationalist, Presbyterian, and Reformed Church missionaries were
spreading throughout both South Africa and Namibia. The spirit of the time,
reminiscent of a parallel thrust inside the U.S. itself to pacify the West and
civilize the natives, is captured in a plea from an American trader, Benjamin
Morrell, who had built extensive networks with the Khoikhoi, Hereros, and
Damaras. Asking the U.S. government for financial support to colonize
Namibia, he wrote in the mid-1840's:
There can be no doubt that a vast field for
commercial enterprise remains to be developed in
this part of Africa ... I ardently hope and trust
that my country will be the first to engage in
exploring this interesting region of the World and
open its boundless riches to her adventurous sons.
I for one, should glory in leading the way, being
perfectly willing to encounter all personal hazard
which might attend a solitary pilgrimage across the
Continent, for the purpose of opening a
permanent and lucrative trade with different tribes
and nations. If the general Government withholds
its patronage for such a laudable undertaking, a
joint-stock company of able capitalists will be
all-sufficient for effecting the purpose and would
be morally certain of gold and returns . . .36

T

The U.S. government didn't directly respond to his request, although
President Lincoln did dispatch troops to Angola to quell a native uprising in
1860. Nonetheless, American commercial interests thrived throughout the
period of German colonization of southwest Africa from 1883 to 1915. The
first five years of the 20th Century were especially significant when the
German forces under General Von Trotha virtually exterminated the Herero
people (50,000 or 85% of the people perished). The United States was second
to Germany in exploiting the Namibian copper mines. In 1917, William P.
Thompson of the Newmont Mining Corporation and J.P. Morgan of the
famous Morgan banking group, participated as major partners in the vast
Anglo American Corporation of South Africa. In the 1920's, led by an American
financier, Chester Bea tty, the copper mining ind us try in both Sou th Africa
and neighboring Rhodesia nearly became dominated by American companies
like American Metal Climax. Ford Motor Company opened its first automobile
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plant in South Africa in 1923. By 1929, Firestone, General Motors, International
Harvester, National City Bank of New York, B.F. Goodrich, P~entice Hall, and
American Cyanamid had opened branches.
'!

In the mid-1950's, the U.S. government joined the Sou th African government
in a joint Atoms for Peace program, set to expire in the year 2007. In the
1960's, the United States joined Israel, other western powers, and Sout_h Africa
in assisting the illegal Rhodesian government in evading the 1966 mandatory
economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations.
Throughout the 1960's, South Africa and the U.S. were an iron fist and velvet
glove duo, providing political, economic, and military support to Portugal as
it desperately sought to maintain its overseas colonies in Africa. South African
troops fought side by side with the Portuguese both in Angola and in
Mozambique. President Richard Nixon followed up the 1970 U.N. sanctions
stemming from the contribution of 22 Cessna duo-purpose light planes to the
South African military in December, 1971 with what he called a Christmas
gift of $436 million in economic assistance to Portugal, all part of the Azores
Pact between Portugal and the U.S. (The Azores Pact was a supplement to
the over $320 million in direct military assistance given to Portugal during
1950-1970, which included military training programs, Boeing 707's, and
regular shipments of napalm and herbicides.)
ut the U.S.-South African relationship was not partisan. Both the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations, gallantly, but more subtly, sang the
B
Lusitanian war hymns. After 1960, the Johnson administration joined the
South African government and Portuguese secret police (P.I.D.E.) in
subsidizing another nationalist figure, Jonas Savimbi. In this way both the
U.S. and South African governments, recognizing the imminent destruction
of the colonial Portuguese empire, were seeking to install African-led and
moderate governments which would be friendly to the "Free World." The
South Africans directly supported the Portuguese. The U.S. sought above all
else to avoid seeing Angola become independent under the M.P. L.A. - the
third and most radical of the Angolan nationalist movements. It is at this
point that the U.S. and South Africans could come together. John F. Kennedy
summarized his general approach to third world nationalist movements in a
1957 speech on Algeria:
The sweep of nationalism is the most potent factor
in foreign affairs today. We can resist it or ignore
it but only for a little while; we can see it exploited
by the Soviets with grave consequences; or we in
this country can give it hope and leadership,
and thus improve immeasurably our standing and
our security. 37
Two episodes, however, dominate the historical landscape of U.S. relations
with sub-Saharan Africa in general and South Africa in particular. Both
illustrate a recurring theme throughout history, namely the extent to which
the "Cold War" competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union governs
all policy decisions taken by the U.S. towards Africa .
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The 1960-1964 crisis in the Belgian Congo (now Zaire) was a case study of the
willingness of the U.S. government to go to any lengths necessary to install
a government sympathetic to American values, institutions, and interests.
Although the Congo affair was, like most, an international political
phenomenon, complex and multi-dimensional, the essence of the U.S. role
was to intervene and prevent the ascension to power of the popularly
supported Patrice Lumumba government and install a pro-Western choice,
Joseph Mobutu. This was done by working bilaterally, through the U.N.
and/or various Western governments.
On SeptemQer 21, 1960, CIA Director Dulles briefed
President Ei's enhower and the National Security
Council. He pointed out that the 'danger of Soviet
influence' was still present in the Congo and said
that while Lumumba had been deposed as Prime
Minister he still represented a threat, particularly
in the light of recent reports of an 'impending
reconciliation' between Lumumba and the new
government. He concluded that 'Mobutu appeared
to be the effective power in the Congo for the
moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of
and remained a grave danger as long as he was
not disposed of. 38
To achieve this goal, the U.S. government both attempted and participated
Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in
Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan,
1982), p. 192.

38 Madeleine
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in the assassination of a democratically elected leader, Patrice Lumumba_,
arranged and financed a mercenary invasion by 400 predominantly white
mercenaries from South Africa and Rhodesia, conducted an air~orn rescue
mission, and aided in militarily installing at the reins of power a man who
by all accounts is one of the world's most corrupt leaders, Joseph Mobutu. 39
While Zaire became impoverished in the 1970's, with unemployment there
reaching between 60 and 80 percent amidst the lowest wage scale in all of
independent Africa, Joseph Sese Seka Mobutu by 1978 is estimated to have
amassed personal holdings of some $4 billion, held primarily in private Swiss
banks. By executive decree he took personal control of 20 percent of the
Zairois budget and 30 percent of its capital expenditures. Despite all this and
further scandals, such as the killing of protesting students at the University
of Zaire by his personal gendarme, every U. S. President since Eisenhower
has lauded and financed Mobutu . Only two countries other than the U.S.
have so enthusiastically embraced Zaire; South Africa and more recently,
Israel. 40 South Africa has used Zaire as a staging ground for raids into Angola,
such as that on the Gulf Oil installation in Cabinda, Angola in May, 1985.
Israel's Ariel Sharon, in one of his last acts as Defense Minister, arranged for
Israel to train Mobutu's personal guard forces and assist Zaire's army.
chilling possibility exists that the U.S. role in the Congo crisis may well
be the archetype for the U.S . role in the unfolding saga of Sou th Africa.
In South Africa, the U.S. may attempt to identify or create another Mobutu;
in other words, a figure who would boost local elites in order to maintain
U.S. economic and strategic hegemony.

A

A second and even more disastrous instance of U.S. di?regard of African
aspirations and open allegiance with apartheid South Africa was the
attempted 1975-1976 military operation against the newly independent
Angolan government conducted by South Africa during the Gerald Ford
administration. On October 23, 1975, South Africa invaded Angola by crossing
the Cunene River. Ostensibly, the reason the South Africans sent 12,000 forces
into Angola was to: 1) protect the Cunene Dam and hydro-electric project;
and 2) engage SWAPO forces. At the time, however, South African leaders
loudly proclaimed that they were also protecting the interests of the Free
World "from the advancing forces of international communism."
The real reason South Africa made such a bold move was that it assumed it
would have the moral support of the West and that the U.S. would invade
militarily. In fact, Prime Minister Vorster made a "liar" out of former Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger denied then, and still denies, that the
39
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U.S. colluded with South Africa in its invasion of Angola. But Professor John
Marcum, a prominent U.S. scholar on Angola, quotes Pretoria officials as
saying that their intervention was based on an understanding with the Ford
Administration that the action would have U.S. support. Marcum goes on to
say: "To the question of whether Washington had 'solicited' South African
involvement, Prime Minister Vorster subsequently responded that he would
not call anyone who said that a 'liar."' Both countries clearly affirmed that
"South Africa entered Angola with the knowledge and approval of the
USA." 41 By mid January 1976, it was clear that U.S. back-up would not be
forthcoming and that the forces of the M.P.L.A., which had been joined by
Cuban forces invited by Angola after South Africa's invasion, were too strong
to be defeated. Thus, in March 1976, the South Africans withdrew from
Angola, defeated. 42
There are several reasons why the Ford administration never sent troops into
Angola. The most obvious is that the Congress, led by Senators Clark and
Tunney, successfully passed legislation prohibiting the Ford administration
from intervening in Angola. Second, a popular movement (which included
a protest march of over 10,000 people in New York City) similar to today's
Free South Africa movement, put pressure on Congress to rein in the Ford
administration. Third, the specter of the U.S., Zaire, Zambia, the Ivory Coast,
EN.LA. and UNITA and South Africa, all combining against the M.P.L.A.,
mobilized a hitherto hesitant Organization of African Unity (OAU).in support
of the yoµng M.P.LA\. govern111ent. Angola, like the Congo crisis of the 19o0's,
illustrated how the anti-communist credo stimulated Washington not only
· into the embrace of its historic ally, South Africa, but also into the dead end
street of disastrous decisions.
,
s these U.S. interventions in southern Africa illustrate, several themes
appear again and again in the saga of the development of the
Pretoria-Peoria axis. These themes have been best discussed by long,..time
activist George Houser, former head of the American Committee on Africa,
in an August, 1984, U.N. publication, "Relations between the United States
and South Africa." He writes that in the 30 years from the 1950's to the 1980's,
in all seven presidencies, "three major themes predominate: 1) Southern
Africa is viewed within the framework of East-West confrontation; 2) South
Africa is seen as the dominant and friendly power in the entire Southern
Africa region; 3) economic considerations are central in determining United
States policy."

A

As we have seen in the discussion of the history of U.S. involvement in
southern Africa, that involvement reflects these themes throughout the
history of U.S.-Africa relations, not just during the 1950's-1980's. Another
important theme of U.S.-Africa relations is the systematic racism which
permeates and motivates the policies, structures, personnel, and practices of
successive U.S. administrations in their interaction with Africa.
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During the Nixon-Ford era, in 1969, Henry Kissinger promoted, as the major
U.S. policy option on South Africa, the famous National Security study
Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) (later President Reagan's "constructive
engagement" policy) with its statement that:
,
The whites are here to stay and the only uiily that
constructive cl1~nge can come about is through tlzem.
J here is no hope for the blacks to gain the political
rights they seek through violence, which will only
lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the
communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our
stance toward the white regimes, encourage some
modification of their current racial and colonial
policies and through more substantial economic
assistance to the black states ... help to draw the
two groups together and exert some influence on
both for peaceful change.'' 43 (Emp};lasis added.)
More, mu:ch more, lay behind the immediate black and white print. Some of
what informed and informs the U.S. approach to Africa in general and
southern Africa in particular was revealed in a February 1984 comment by
businessman William Coors. Addressing a Denver meeting of minority
businessmen, he said:
One of the best things slave traders did was to drag
· the ancestors of American blacks over here in
chains because today American blacks are exposed
to greater opportunity than African blacks. 44
Mr. Coors also reputedly said Zimbabwean blacks "lack the intellectual
capacity to succeed, and it's taking them down the tubes." His remarks assume
more significance when one is reminded that Coors and his money are the
main pillars behind two organizations which actively lobby on behalf of South
Africa and are looked to as major formulators of policy by the Reagan
administration: the Heritage Foundation and the American Legislative
Exchange Council. Thus, the historical devel~pment of U.S . corporate and
governmental embrace of apartheid (the Pretoria-Peoria axis) can, at least in
part, be situated at that juncture where two historic forms of racism, one from
the U.S., the other from South Africa, grimly lock arms.
South Africa's Public Relations Campaign
1

et it is not simply history that has brought the U.S. and South Africa so
close. The Pretoria-Peoria axis is, at least in part, the result of a specific
offensive waged by South Africa to gain friends and "neutralize" enemies in
the U.S. In 1983, the South African government spent a minimum of $1.5
million hiring 31 professional lobbyists (largely lawyers and/or public relations
personnel) as registered agents for the South African government. Since 1974,

Y
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the South African government has doled out a minimum of $7 million on
lobbyists in the U.S. 45
In addition to those mechanisms, the quasi-governmental South Africa
Foundation and the South Africa Tourist Corporation are two institutions
whose sole reason for being in the U.S. is to create a positive image of South
Africa in the eyes of the American public. Each institution functions with
a multimillion dollar budget. One of the major functions of the South African
Foundation is to finance trips to South Africa for U.S. corporate and
government leaders. An example of one such visitor is Hobart Taylor, a black
American businessman, who, besides being on the board of directors for
Westinghouse, A&P, and Burroughs, was also on the board of the
Export-Im port Bank from 1965-1968 when some key bank loans to Sou th Africa
were facilitated. Another of the foundation's more prominent guests was
Clarence Randall, former chairman of Inland Steel. Randall went on ··one of
the junkets in 1963 while serving as financial adviser to President John F.
Kennedy. In 1964, just in case the International Court of Justice ruled against
South Africa, Randall threatened U.S. military intervention to occupy
Walvis Bay, Namibia's main harbor, to assure continued South African illegal - occupation. 46
In addition to the propaganda vehicles cited above, South Africa maintains
operations in foreign countries which function at another level, the level
where "no rules need apply." In what later became known as "The Muldergate
Scandal," it was revealed that, beginning from approximately 1972, the South
African Information Department, then headed by Eschel Rhoodie, spent a
minimum of $100 million on 180 secret projects aimed at thirteen countries
on five continents. The projects included secret political programs and" dirty
tricks" ranging from bribes and clandestine purchases of media outlets to
possible murder. 47 Moreover, it has come to light that the Muldergate offensive
was one of several offensives conducted by various South African departments
and officials. According to several informative and reliable articles in recent
years, other programs were and probably still are carried out by the South
African Department of Defense, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and
various branches of the South African police. A well documented a·rticle based
on South African government figures in The Nation of April 19, 1980 revealed
that "the South African Department of Defense spent at least $110 million on
secret projects between 1974 and 1979. " 48
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In November 1978, liberal Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa) was a victim of one
of the South African "projects" when he was defeated in his reelection bid
for the U.S. Senate. According to Esche! Rhoodie's later revelations, th~ South
African Information Department provided $250,000 to the campaign war chest
of Clark's opponent, Republican Roger W. Jepson. Additionally, funds of
unknown quantity were put jnto the Right to Life Movement's door to door
effort against Clark because of his alleged pro-abortion stance. Interviewed
subsequently by TransAfrica-Forum magazine, Senator Clark highlighted the
significance of the South African role in his defeat, reminiscing that:
The first time I went to South Africa in 1976, I met
with Prime Minister John Vorster. It was the most
difficult meeting I ever went to in my life. For an
hour he quoted to me things I had said or done
.. . . they've ~bviously got (our) country well
covered in terms of what's happening where and
who is doing what and why.... The Prime
Minister had more information and knew more
about what I had said than I remembered. 49
Why Senator Dick Clark?-Previous South African intervention projects in U.S.
politics were targetted at the Presidential level. Specifically, South African
functionaries had developed ties to candidate Jimmy Carter and reputedly
had donated $20,000 to his primary campaign in New York state. Even more
important, according to The Sunday Express of Johannesburg dated March 25,
1979, President Gerald Ford's 1976 campaign had received an infusion of some
$3. 9 million in secret funding which came via various third party front
organizations. Whether or not former President Ford was aware of the source
and channelling of this sum is not known. But subsequent policies
implemented by the Ford Administration show Ford to be supportive of South
Africa. As Richard Leonard points out in his recent book:
In 1975 and 1976 the Ford Administration, carrying
out policies shaped by Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, cooperated with the Sou th African
invasion of Angola in the clandestine CIA
intervention aimed at defeating the MPLA. The
intervention failed but the South Africans certainly
would have had every reason to want Ford to win
the 1979 presidential election. In 1979 Ford gave a
speech on relations between the United States and
South Africa at a seminar in Houston for the South
African Foreign Trade Association and the SenBank
of South Africa. SenBank paid Ford $10,000, but
according to Rhoodie the bank was reimbursed by
the Information Department. Ford's speech was
used in a special supplement on South Africa in
Business Week magazine (October 1979). That
49 Senator
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supplement was also secretly underwritten by the
Information Department. '' 50
But why Dick Clark as a target of the South African political influence? The
answer is to be found in a now little-known official Senate study done by the
Senate Sub-committee on Africa in 1978. Chaired by Senator Clark, this
prestigious Senate Sub-committee concluded in its study that:
By end - 1976, South Africa's overseas debt
equaled $7.6 billion of which $2.2 billion, or nearly
one-third of all bank claims on South Africa, was
owed to U.S. banks and their foreign branches. . . .
The $2.2 billion of American credit outstanding in
1976 is roughly equivalent to the amount of foreign
exchange required to cover South Africa's defense
and oil imports costs for the same year. . .51
In addition the study reported that "the net effect of American investment
in South Africa has been to strengthen ·the economic and military
self-sufficiency of South Africa's apartheid regime .... " 52 Given Senator
Clark's role in stopping the entry of U.S. troops into Angola to back up the
October, 1975 South African invasions, he was clearly not a favorite son of
the Pretoria regime. And with the study coming so soon after the events of
1976 (including the Soweto shooting of 1,000 students, and the Fall, 1977
bannings of nearly 20 black and white organizations), and in addition, its
being one of the very few U.S. Senate pronouncements on foreign affairs in
1978, the study was a serious blow to South Africa's international image.
Therefore, South African government operatives had reason to deploy
substantial means to defeat Senator Clark.
O'

he fa_mous Rev. Allan Boesa~, a colored Dutch Reformed Mission Minister,
T
President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and a founder of
the militant new organization the United Democratic Front (UDF), has recently
experienced how the South African government can lay aside the velvet gloves
and strike more painfully with the iron fist. After months of taping and
monitoring his life and movements, the South African police "discovered"
that Rev. Boesak was having a love affair with a white staff member of the
South African Council of Churches. The police passed the information about
the affair, including a bedroom scene tape, to the Johannesburg Star newspaper,
hoping to smear Boesak and wreak havoc on his personal life.
The project failed largely because the church did not expel Boesak but merely
suspended him temporarily and because some of the reporters involved also
discovered and exposed the role of the South African police in creating the
entire situation. But the importance of the cases of Rev. Boesakand Senator
Dick Clark is the range of methods, such as systematic "disinformation,"
which the South African government and its various apparatuses will employ
in order to achieve a given goal. As Brigadier Johan Van der Merwe, a leading
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officer of the South African security forces, commented after Rev. Boesak's
reinstatement:
[I] ... see nothing immoral in spreading fa~se
information about "subversive" organizations,
such as the South African Council of Churches, to
which Boesak belongs, "so long as it does not harm
the m brals of the community we serve." 53
These cases, however, are not the worst of South Africa's repressive tactics.
Assassinations and killings under suspicious circumstances are not novel in
South Africa. In addition to the well-known deaths in detention of Steve Biko
(1977) and trade unionist Dr. Neil Aggett (February, 1982), Lutheran lay
preacher, Tshifhiwa Muefhe (January, 1982), and Transkei opposition leader
Manana Mgqweto (September, 1981), the following deaths point to the work
of "hit squads" acting in the interest of, or as an arm of, the South African
government: 1) Griffiths Mxenge, found with his throat cut in the city morgue
(November, 1981); 2) Hennie Ferrus, killed in a "questionable car accident"
(August, 1981); 3) Diliswa Roxiso, fiancee of activist trade unionistThozamile
Gqweta, killed by "questionable" police fire in 1981; 4) Rev. Frikkie Conradie,
white colleague of Alan Boesak, killed in a "questionable car accident" (March,
1982); 5) Joe Mavi, President of the Black Municipal Workers Union, killed
when his car overturned in 1982; 6) Teboho Noko, and 7) Paul Leboea,
organizers for the black National Union of Mineworkers, killed in a car accident
(March, 1983); 8) Stephen Maseko, organizer for the National Automobile and
Allied Workers Union, killed in an automobile collision; 9) Rev. James Gawe,
Anglican rector, found dead and drunk where his car had overturned in an
accident considered questionable because of his 22 year history of abstention
(June, 1984); 10) Bongani Khumalo, Secretary of the Soweto branch of the
student movement, COSAS, shot dead as he walked out of his Soweto home
(September, 1984); 11) Jeanette Schoon, a teacher, and 12) her daughter,
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Katryn, killed opening a parcel bomb at their home in Angola Oune, 1984);
13) Vernon Nkadimeng, son of the general secretary of the banned South
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), killed in a car bomb explosion
in Gaberone, Botswana (May, 1985); and 14) Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata,
Sparrow Mkhonto, ai:id Salaelo Mhlawuhli, whose four bodies were found
mutilated and burned near their hijacked car in the Eastern Cape where they
had been "missing" for nearly a week. At a July 4, 1985 press conference
other Eastern Cape community activists reported that another 27 people had
disappeared in the Eastern Cape, the Transvaal, and Orange Free State and
20 others were on "hit lists" - including Bishop Desmond Tutu and Rev.
Alan Boesack - drawn up and circulated by the regime or its agents: Less
than a month later, on July 31, 1985, Victoria Nonyamezelo Mxenge, wife of
Griffiths Mxenge and the key attorney for 16 defendants in a treason trial,
was shot to death as she arrived home.
~-

s

ubstantial evidence points to three types of assassins: the authorities
themselves, extreme right-wing groups of whites with police or military
connections, and blacks hired by either the government or right-wing groups.
As in the case of death squads elsewhere, the regime attempts to place blame
for the killings or disappearances on the opposition groups seeking to change
the government in power. In South Africa, the government and police simply
attribute ~uch deaths to the tensions and quarrels between the two major
opposition groups, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Azanian
People's Organization (AZAPO). But further evidence of the existence of South
African government sponsor.e d assassination units is provided by U.S.
Defense Department classified intelligence reports released by Randall
Robinson of TransAfrica in 1981. These documents discuss the activities of a .
"hit squad" authorized by the South African government for the purpose of
killing African National Congress leaders. Finally, the comments of General
van den Berghe, former head of the South African Bureau of State Security
(BOSS), to the 1978 Erasmus Commission of Inquiry into Muldergate are
suggestive:
Mr. Commissioner, I really want to tell you that I
am able with my department to do the impossible.
This is not bragging .... I don't have weak men,
I have good men .... I can tell you here, not for
your records, but I can tell you, I have enough men
to commit murder if I tell them: Kill .... I don't
care who the prey is, these are the type of men I
have .... 54
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Reagan's Policy
of ''Constructive
Engagement"

he Ronald Reagan administration and its policy of "constructive
engagement" towards Sou th Africa is a change from previous
administrations. No administration has gone so far or has been so crude in
its initiatives as the Reagan administration in seeking to dominate the African
continent. If the approach of the Carter administration was to coyly cozy up
to the Southern African liberation movements (for example the African
National Congress (ANC) and the Southwest African People's Organization
(SWAPO)) and then "manage" them, the approach of Ronald Reagan today
is to: 1) isolate the Southern African liberation movements, represented by
organizations such as the ANC and SWAPO; and 2) label them "terrorist" in
various systematic press and media treatment, opening the door to American
hostility or attack. This approach follows Ronald Reagan's basic perspective
toward the "Third World" nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Reagan's
first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig,·stated this view very succinctly within
weeks after assuming the reins of the State Department: "The so-called wars
of national liberation are putting in jeopardy our ability to influence world
events ... and to assure a~cess to raw materials. " 55

T

The Carter administration, like the Reagan administration and other past U.S.
administrations, believed that southern Africa and South Africa, with its rich
and vast mineral resources was an area that the "Free World" could not afford
to lose. The Carter administration believed that the best way to keep Africa
in the U.S. orbit of influence was to be close to the liberation movements and
to manipulate them. In order to gain respectability within independent Africa,
it condemned and chastized South Africa on certain levels, though not
economically. For instance, the Carter administration, with few exceptions,
did not permit military or related equipment to be exported to South Africa.
The Reagan administration, by contrast, allowed $28.2 million worth of such
equipment to be exported between 1981 and 1983 arid more than $88 million
in the first part of 1984.
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Police interrogate a
worker during
munidpal workers'
strike, 1980.

Only two weeks after the 1981 inauguration of Ronald Reagan, South African
commandos raided ANC houses in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, coldly
assassinating 13 key ANC and trade unionist cadre. This attack can be seen
in the context of the Congressional hearings convened later by Senator
Jeremiah Denton (R-Alabama), allegedly held in order to examine the Soviet
links to the ANC and SWAPO but really designed to expose and harass ANC
and SWAPO n~works and supporters in the U.S. The Maputo raid can also
be seen in the context of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service's investigation
into the Africa Fund during 1983-84 which, like the National Council of
Churches, was a longtime supporter of ANC and SWAPO humanitarian
projects. In addition, the South African government-backed U.S.-Southwest
Africa Trade and Cultural Council attempted to get the IRS to terminate the
World Council of Churches' tax exempt status in 1981-1982 because of its
relationship and humanitarian grants to the ANC, SWAPO, and other
liberation movements.

Reagan's Policy 37

he aggressive foreign policy ~pproach of the Reag~n Ad~inistration ~as
also evident in 1983 at the time of the Grenada mvas1on when Afncan
governments suddenly found their food aid packages ~educed or cancelled.
Most notably, Zimbabwe learned in December 1983 that a grant of $,75 million
had been cut in half because of "its support for a UN resolution deploring
the intervention in Grenada and its failure to support various American
resolutions in the UN." The,food weapon was also employed against Angola
and Mozambique in 1983. It was employed against Mozambique because
Mozambique expelled several CIA functionaries from the U.S. embassy in
Maputo and because the Soviets made a naval port call at Maputo. Longtime
U.S. foreign policy commentator Claudia Wright summarized the whole
approach when she observed in 1983:
The Reagan administration is confident that the
frontline states that support South Africa's guerrilla
movements will crumble under direct South
African attack and indirect American economic
pressure. The economic part of the strategy is
intended to demonstrate, in the words of Richard
But, the State Department's Director of
Politico-Military Affairs, that 'it pays to be an
American friend.,s 6

T

But why is the Reagan administration different? Ronald Reagan personally
has had long standing sylll.pathies with South Africa's white government. In
1965, when he was running for governor, he visited then Massachusetts ·
Attorney General Edward Brooke in Massachusetts. While there, during a
luncheon speech on the emergent African nations, he joked, "when they
have a man for lunch, they really have him for lunch." While governor of
California, he hosted South African business and government leaders,
publicly identifying South Africa as an old friend.
In 1976, running against President Ford, Reagan proposed sending U.S.
occupation troops to Rhodesia in order "to prevent further bloodshed." He
suggested this after seeing a St. Louis newspaper advertisement showing
numerous dead black Rhodesians and one white Rhodesian, a small white
girl, with the caption "Bayoneted a Dozen Times." Prior to the 1980 election,
one of Reagan's Africa advisors characterized his boss's views on South Africa
as singularly one-dimensional, remarking: "The problem with Reagan is that
all he knows about Southern Africa is that he's on the side of the whites. " 57
But such positions and racist jokes should not be surprising. In the 1940's,
Reagan placed restrictive covenant leases on his and his neighbors' properties
in California enjoining any non-Europeans, except for hired help, from
occupying the premises. In 1967, he fought fair housing legislation, stating
that he was opposed to telling people what to do with their property and
that "This has nothing to do with discrimination. It has to do with our
56Claudia

Wright, "Ronald Reagan's Boer War," New

Statesman, .April 3, 1981, p. 11. ·
57Elizabeth

Schmidt, "Marching to Pretoria: Reagan's
South Africa Policy on the Move, TransAfrica Forum, Fall,
1983, p. 5.

38

Apartheid In Our Living Rooms

freedom." 58 Reagan's record as President speaks for itself. His administration's
policies are predictable and consistent with his personal stance of embracing
the South African apartheid system.
ome _o f Ronald Reagan's appointments also clearly show his human rights
sentiments. Marianne Mele Hall, $70,000 a year chair of the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, co-authored the 1983 volume Foundations of Sand which
alleges that:
One of the problems confron_ting America
is that blacks 'insist on preserving their jungle
freedoms, their women, their avoidance of
personal responsibility and their abhorrence of
the work ethic.

S

Also culpable, it contends, are the social scientists who "put blacks on welfare
so they can continue their jungle freedoms of leisure time and subsidized
procreation. " 59
Peter J. Duignan, Reagan's proposed (later confirmed) Director of the National
Archives, was called "controversial" by _the May 18, 1985 Washington Post
because of his view that the U.S. should "extend rather than diminish contact
with South Africa." In fact, Duignan, a specialist in African Studies at the
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, is renowned for his negative
and racist views towards Africans despite the years he has spent cataloguing
and bibliographing African history and achievements. In one of his more
classic works, he asserts that the:
... colonial empire in Africa was one of the most
efficacious engines of cultural diffusion in world
history. Imperial rule involved a vast transfer of
human and physical capital to Africa. Much of
Africa benefited not merely from enormous private
and public investments in brick and mortar, but
also from a great transfer of human abilities to
Africa. The efforts made by privately subsidized
mission societies and similar organizations alone
form an outstanding chapter in the history of
civilization. " 60
This apologetic and ahistorical stance along with such additional beliefs as
his thesis that the slave trade was a stimulus to population growth in West
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Africa because it introduced American plants and fruit are quite consistent
with his long-held and deeply cherished belief that South Africa's whites are
61
"destined to prevail over the African continent."
.
It is an undisputable fact that Ronald Reagan's policies and actions reflect a

systematic disposition against black people as a group. However, Ronald
Reagan's personal racism, whether reflected in his words or deeds, is not an
adequate explanation of the U.S. posture towards the Pretoria regime.
Reagan's personal actions are not the full story. U.S. foreign policy-making
does not operate in a vacuum. The overwhelmingly white and male American
officials who formulate· and implement policy do so within specific
socio-economic and historic circumstances. Decisions are made in a specific
context. That context is one in which racism permeates every facet of American
society and therefore affects most decisions related to Africa.

FEIFFER

Cartoon appearing in The Washington Post, Sunday, January 20, 1985.
U.S. policy toward Pretoria has long been shaped by a thinly veiled desire to
side with the white minority, or, at minimum, to do nothing fundamentally
against that group and the inability to see U.S. interests linked to those of
the black majority. This "racist" view towards Africa is at once both economic
and social. It is derived from the U.S. 'sown history as a slave-holding nation,
its brutal settlement of the West, its pacification of native Americans, and
from the profit return rates which cheap labor in South Africa and elsewhere
in the "Third World" have long provided U.S. multinationals.
U.S. foreign policy towards Africa is rooted in a historical topsoil which saw,
. as prominent critic Manning Marable recently noted, "over 5,000 black
Americans lynched between 1882 and 1927 and many publicly burned. " 62 But
it also stems from the thorough and systematic negation or cooptation of
black and other non-white peoples' cultures and values in U.S. society, an
61 L.
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institutionalized practice which has driven overseas some of America's "best,"
its actors and writers, scholars and athletes, to places where they could be
embraced and appreciated, countries where they could participate. That
American cabinet officials would beat upon the table mocking natives playing
drums or joke about cannibalism comes as no surprise given a generation
raised on Africa as "the dark continent," "the Zulu warrior," "the sleeping
giant" and countless other images projected by movies like The African Queen,
King Solomon's Mines and authors like Edgar Rice Burroughs and Robert Ruark.
It is the same generation fed a steady dose of black America as '~mos and
·Andy," "The Jeffersons," Beulahland, or Mr. T, all mystified by the racist
theories of William Shockley and Arthur R. Jensen. And it is within this
historical context of attitudes and practices toward black people, that most
white South Africans and most white Americans potentially become kith
and kin.
America's ·Need To Win

eginning in 1980, there has been a resurgence in racism on an international
level. In Europe and North America a dramatic rise in the incidence of
B
racial violence has been noted. The Ku Klux Klan, the Nazi Party, the Aryan
Nation have enjoyed revived support. A number of conservative
administrations have come to power (led by President Reagan, Prime Minister
Begin of Israel, President Botha of South Africa, and Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher of Great Britain) which either explicitly or implicitly condone, arouse,
or sustain organized racism. In both Europe and the U.S. there has been
greater and greater use of rituals and decoratives to reinvigorate dominant
cultures. In Germany, increased reference to "greater Germany," in Britain,
increased reliance on the throne as a national symbol, and in the U.S., a
widespread, state-backed appeal to the values of "God, family, and country"
has been revived. In this setting, the Larry Byrds and Mary Lou Rettons of
sp9rts fame personify the right values.
The 1970's, with the defeat of the U.S. in the Vietnam War and anti-colonial
victories in Portuguese Africa, marked the decline of overseas empires.
Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, the handover of the Panama Canal, and the
heightened struggle in El Salvador represent important setbacks to the
empe.rors and empire brokers of the "Free World."
The historical period in which these dynamics appear is one characterized on
the economic level by deep global crisis. The former dominant industries, like
the U.S. auto and steel industry, are close to total collapse. Structural changes,
with much job displacement and loss, are ushered in throughout the world's
labor market, bringing with them intense social insecurity and tensions. Enter
the Ronald Reagan Administration in 1981, an administration which represents
an important departure from previous administrations. It is not simply that
the Reagan Administration represents the ascendence of Western oil and the
interests of the energy barons over traditional East Coast capital, the victory
of the West's cowboys over the East Coast's bankers and the Midwest's
industrialists. It also represents a new style of politics - one that is more
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coarse and crude. The world-view of the newly triumphant "Rambo"
conservatives allows for no grey tones. For them, especially the old guard
such as Reagan, Jesse Helms, Pat Buchanan and Howard Phillips of the
Conservative Caucus, the world is an apocalyptic struggle between the forces
of darkness and the forces of light, between good and evil, capitalism and
communism, the United St?tes and the Soviet Union. Though there are splits
and distinctions to be made among the conservative forces which vie for
dominance in the Reagan Administration, they share one fundamental_belief:
that only fast, decisive action by (white) Americans can resolve the world's
problems.
Thus, with the inauguration of Ronald Reagan we have the reintroduction of
the U.S. as a global policeman, one which relies on formal allies and other
countries as deputy policemen. During the fall of 1983, Grenada was invaded
by the U.S. government, backed up by deputized Caribbean c·o untries. It was
an invasion aimed at toppling a small island populated by black people who
were militarily incapable of being a threat to the U.S. It also aimed at freeing
white American medical students, allegedly threatened by a black,
Cuba-leaning Marxist government. And another specific objective was to
prove to theThird World and U.S. populations that post-Vietnam America
was once again "walkin' tall!"
It is at this same historical juncture that the Ronald Reagan administration,

immediately after the inauguration, began a policy towards South Africa
which gave the Boer Republic more support and encouragement than had
been given by any previous U.S. administration. And it is this historical context
that fueled the Wall Street Journal editorial, quoted below, which was published
on November 30, 1983, shortly after the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Entitled
"Why Not Victory?," the editorial, heralded the end of defeatism in U.S.
foreign policy and called for Angola to be invaded next:
Big Oil, and the Chase Manhattan Bank, have been
the main American lobby for the Cuban and
Russian backed Luanda regime. . . . American
interests don't require keeping the U.N. or Big Oil
happy. But they do have something to do with
stopping the Soviet-Cuban romp through the Third
World, especially when the people who live there
are asking American help against the new Marxist
colonialists. Whatever the defeatist habits of the
foreign policy establishment, the public response
to Grenada shows that the American people are
ready to start winning again.
The Corporatization of U.S. Foreign Policy
he U.S. policy debate on South Africa has changed considerably since the
1960's and 1970's. The divestment movement, the effort to withdraw
organizational and public funds from companies and banks involved with
South Africa, gained momentum in the early 1980's. According to a statement
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from the American Committee on Africa, by June, 1985 the seven states of
Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska and
Wisconsin, the territory of the Virgin Islands, 28 cities including Washington,
New York and Boston, and three counties had divested or otherwise restricted
$1.8 billion from U.S. companies and banks involved in South Africa. Rushing
to create a cabinet-level post to deal with divestment, the South African
government characterized the divestment lobby as "taking action that could
strike telling blows on South Africa. " 63
Beginning in 1984, powerful black American organizations like TransAfrica
and the NAACP are more engaged and have been organizing public
demonstrations through the "Free South Africa Movement." From Texas to
Minnesota, from Maine to California, hundreds of thousands of black people
and their allies have mobilized. Organized labor, specifically the AFL-CIO, is
also beginning to mobilize on the South African apartheid question in a ·
manner which it never did during the Vietnam War period. The serious entry
of these two constituencies with their numbers and organizational resources
has significantly altered the stakes from the days when apartheid was largely
a concern of. the churches, some campuses, and a few small groups whose
full time work was on behalf of Africa. And undoubtedly as more
municipalities and state legislatures examine the.ir investment portfolios and
pension funds, as more people learn the details about the Pretoria-Peoria
axis, the organized black community, labor, and some church bodies will raise
the stakes even higher.
But the group which has most altered and will continue to alter the terms of
the debate, is the U.S. corporate community. According to one recent and
reliable source, today there are 284 companies which operate directly in South
Africa, which include Citicorp, Continental Illinois, General Motors, IBM,
General Electric, and Mobil. In 1981, the value of these companies' operations
in South Africa was $2.6 billion. By the end of 1983, this figure had dropped
to $2.3 billion. 64
Those direct operations, however, are not the whole picture of the U.S.
corporate community's contribution in South Africa. The key factor is that
U.S. companies dominate the most important sectors of the economy: oil,
computers, electronics, communications, and the motor industry.
63
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Additionally, beginning in late 1983, U.S. nationals, both companies and
individuals, hold 57%, or $8 billion worth of the foreign investments in gold,
diamonds, and other commodities on the Johannesburg stock exchange. At
the end of 1984, U.S. banks had loaned $4. 7 billion to South Africar;i borrowers,
making U.S. banks South Africa's most important source for big capital. The
loans, incidentally, are a dollar flow to the South African public and private
sectors and to banks in South Africa. Currently, the bulk of the loan flow
goes to private customers. But the loans to banks are crucial for an economy
which is currently very depressed.
,
An excellent illustration of the critical role played by the loans to private
customers is a 1982 $100 million loan to South Africa's African Explosives and
Chemical Industries (AECI) negotiated by Citicorp. 65 Reportedly, the loan
was for AECI's "general financing requirements." AECI, however, besides
being the sole source of explosives for the gold mines, also runs three
munitions plants and has an exclusive monopoly on packing explosives into
shells. A 1977 investigation supported by the British Council of Churches
found that AECI also makes nerve gas, defoliants, and napalm and
manufactured most of the tear gas used against protesting children in
the 1976 Soweto uprising. 66
oday the U.S~ corporate community is worried. has encountered protest
T
since the 1960's, but nothing like the scale of the protest today. Nor has
it experienced anything as visible as the anti-apartheid mobilization of today.
It

Divestment, as a means of both isolating apartheid and of intensifying the
pressure on the South Africa state, clearly threatens both U.S. and South
African corporate and governmental circles. Though the campaign·for
divestment began as a whisper in the Oregon state legislature in 1980-1981,
it steadily grew as a tactic and as of May, 1986 divestment bills had been
introduced into the legislatures of over 40 states. Additionally, seventeen
states, sixty cities, and nine counties had successfully enacted various laws
ranging from selective purchasing to limiting pension funds, all of which
restricted state and/or municipal funds from being implicated in supporting
apartheid. By the end of 1985 the value of the withdrawal of this funding
was estimated at over .five billion dollars. John Chettle, director of the
Washington, D.C.-based South Africa Foundation, attested to the impact of
the divestment campaign when he candidly commented in South Africa's
equivalent of the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Mail (Johannesburg) on
February 1, 1985:
In one respect at least, the divestment forces have
already won. They have prevented- discouraged,
dissuaded, whatever you call it- billions of dollars
. . . . (from) . . . new investors who were looking
for foreign opportunities from coming to South
Africa.
Recently, Steve Bisenus, head of the American Chamber of Commerce in
South Africa, one key organizational vehicle for U.S. corporations involved
65
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with South Africa, has called upon his colleagues to be serious about the near
tidal wave threat which the U.S. divestment movement, led by "Castro and
Arafat-led TransAfrica," is posing. 67
The U.S. business community and its lobbying forces have begun to gear up
in response to the divestment movement. The Heritage Foundation, with its
$7.1 million budget, and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC),
both backed by Coors Company and the Mellon family's banking, oil and
industry fortune, have already started targeting specific organizations. The
Heritage Foundation has been attacking the African American Institute (AAI)
in New York- an organization involved in Africa questions, with many east
coast corporate and church linkages - because of its "too liberal policies"
and extensive ties to the liberation movement, the African National Congress.
ALEC has been organizing systematically, often using South African
government materials~ to inundate legislators with anti-divestme9t and
pro-South Africa arguments and literature.
Thus, when Ronald Reagan says his administration will embrace South Africa
as a "friendly country," an ally, it is not just the office of the presidency
speaking. It is the presidency expressing the corporate special interests and
powers which increasingly determine the ebb and flow of U.S. foreign policy.
It is the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, with its corporate
directors from Mellon Bank, Standard Oil of Indiana, Sun Oil, and United
Technologies, all deeply invested in South African apartheid, which is
speaking. It is the will and perspective of the American Enterprise Institute
(AEI), with its staff of 135 and $10 million annual budget and corporate funding
from American Cyanamid, Dow Chemical, and Chase Bank, all of whom
have been beneficiaries of the 12-17% profit return rates from the apartheid
system, which is also being expressed.
he well-organized and well financed activities of over 30 Washington, D. C.
professional lobbyists, acting on behalf of their own and their clients'
T
interests, have stimulated and helped to buoy the U.S. historical embrace of
South Africa. These lobbyists are mostly law firms headquartered in
Washington, D.C. Some are little known law firms like Rubenstein, Wolfson
and Company which canvasses and pressures Congress and Congressional
staff regarding South African gold. Other firms like Smathers Symington and
Herlong are more well known and even include prominent liberal personalities
like former Missouri Democratic Senator Stuart Symington. In 1981,
Symington's firm received $400,000 from the South African government for
its assistance in defeating legislation aimed at limiting new investment in
South Africa. The most well connected of the currently active lobbyists is John
Sears, who was Ronald Reagan's campaign manager in 1980. The South African
government views the $500,000 a year which he receives as money well spent
because it gives them easy access to the President and other Cabinet members.
The lobbyists do many things. They host dinners and parties. They arrange
all expenses paid trips to South Africa, and hostesses at places like The Sun
City Hotel in the Bophuthatswana bantustan. They arrange hunting safaris
to Kruger National Park. In between, the lobbyists present arguments on the
Bisenus, ''The Threat Is Serious,'' Financial Mail
(SA), January 11, 1985, p. 34.
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mineral dependency of the U.S. on South Africa and the necessity that U.S.
corporations teach the black South African workers how to be good trade
unionists. And sometimes they write speeches for politicians who need them.
Or, at times, they quietly arrange the speaking engagement, write;the speech,
and forward the speaker's honorarium from the South African government.
This was the case at a June 1979 Palm Springs Conference arranged by lobbyist
Sidney Baran featuring General William Westmoreland who received $4,000
for his appearance. 68 But the speechwriting is complimentary work. It is the
insiders clout, the secret contributions, and fringe benefits that do most to
get the attention of the Washington, D.C. decision makers.
1

Most significantly, during the 1980's, corporations have learned to act as a
unified group. They are now more adept at submerging their individual
interests in order to act jointly based on their shared national, class, and racial
interests. Thus, International Harvester and Mobil will join with competitor
companies like Standard Oil of Indiana and Caterpillar to link up with the

Police action during 1984
election.
Chicago South African Consulate to defeat an Illinois divestment bill. The
question becomes: will the major South Africa-linked U.S. corporations gear
up the 2,800 state and local Chambers of Commerce and National Association
of Manufacturers offices across the U.S. to oppose, with massive direct mail
campaigns and advertising, any and all efforts at withdrawing U.S. investment
from South Africa? Also, will the 1,467 corporate and trade association PACs
in Washington be mobilized to oppose divestment initiatives on the federal
level?
he race factor is one which is rarely addressed, even by anti-apartheid
critics. Most of the American executives who manage the U.S. corporate
operations in South Africa are white men. Publicly, all claim they abhor
apartheid. Almost all of them would favor a modification of apartheid but
only insofar as current profit maximization levels were maintained.

T
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Incidentally, current profit return rates from apartheid enterprises hover at
about 7%. Though high compared to global averages, this 1982-1983 figure is
down from the 31 % after-tax profit rate available in 1980. 69 Most white
American businessmen in South Africa would probably modify apartheid
only so far, even if such modification might mean more streamlined
operations, lower labor costs, and higher profits.
An issue of Fortune magazine in 1972 cites a 1969 market research poll's finding
that three quarters of the U.S. businessmen living in South Africa "approve
of apartheid as an approach that is, under the circumstances at least, an
attempt to develop a solution. " 70 The same article quotes then managing
director of International Harvester's South African subsidiary as having
publicly told a visiting U.S. church group:
I am sympathetic to what the South African
government is trying to do. I don't want hundreds
of Africans running around in front of my house. 71
The racist attitudes which many, perhaps most, American business and
governmental representatives bring with them to South Africa are sometimes
even less veiled in the 1980's than in the 1960's and 1970's. In March 1983,
Illinois Senator Roger Keats went on an all expenses paid junket to South
Africa. He lauded South Africa as a great country by reporting that "many
areas looked better than the west side of Chicago and one could walk their
blacks' streets." He returned brimming about the things he had learned.
Noting that before he'd gone he "couldn't tell the difference between blacks,
coloureds, whites or Indians," he shared some of the knowledge related to
race which he had acquired. He had learned that:
Although the Zulus are the most numerous, they
are not very popular. Like our Irish who often want
to be police, Zulus are often policemen ....
Whites, Indians and coloureds worked on
punctuality, but blacks worked on the idea of
eventuality. It's a warm and pleasant country, they
[the blacks] take their time. It makes Mexicans look
efficient. 72 (Emphasis added.)
The May 23, 1985 public comment of Cornell University Vice President,
William Herbster, also demonstrates that a truly base predisposition really
regulates a veneer of corporate calm. When asked by a black Squth African
student in front of a live television audience if he would have been prepared
to invest in corporations dealing with Nazi Germany, employing the argument
that some of the people living under Nazism would thereby be benefited,
Herbster replied:
If they had a Sullivan Code (labor standards
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employed voluntarily by U.S. corporations), I
would think so .... I would have felt comfortable
at the time, if they had a standard against which
they were operating, and if they were trying to
operate responsibly. 73
,:
ut there is al~o another le:7el <;1t which the corporate co1:1mu~ity will garner

its clout and influence. 1s th e "old boy" network which will gear up to
B
strengthen the administration's stance of embracing the apartheid state.
It

Former Secretary of State and President of United Technologies Corporation,
Alexander Haig, will meet with the President or his aides to remind them
how critical South Africa's minerals are to the Free World and especially for
United Technology's being able to retain a cheap way of procuring platinum.
Or he will appear at a public forum to endorse Reagan's "constructive
engagement" with South Africa. For example, in February 1984, he was the
guest speaker at s~veral public occasions (including South Africa's Israel
United Appeal's fundraising dinners) in South Africa sponsored by the South
African Manpower and Management Foundation. 74
William Simon, former Treasury Secretary, lauded South Africa in a November
21, 1977 Business Week article as the place where "foreign investors could avail

themselves of the opportunities to reap handsome rewards." The article
reported that he will write a series of editorial opinion pieces for several of
the country's big newspapers. Each will be published-without question or
challenge - and each will open with the phrase "like all good Americans
I too abhor apartheid." 75
Standard Oil of California, Mobil, Dow, Fluor; General Electric, General
Motors, Caterpillar and Readers Digest Association are a few of the companies
heavily involved in South Africa. They are Ronald Reagan's friends and
contributors. These are the forces which influence the Reagan administration.
It is these corporate voices, not those "strident tones" of the United Nations,
Sweden, Holland or India, the World Council of Churches (WCC), the United
Methodist Church, the U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference or the Organization
of Africa Unity (OAU), which are heard.
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South Africa's
War in the U.S.

eanwhile, today the South African government is intensifying its war
in the United States. The war includes various tactics. Pretoria is
following the 1981 advice offered by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa,
Chester Crocker. When commenting to then Secretary of State Alexander
Haig, he said, "You will need to respond with an artful combination of
gestures and hints." At the same time that the reform "gestures" are being
made, South Africa also pursues the path of "unconventional offensive"
suggested by Esche! Rhoodie, former South African Information Department
Secretary in the U.S.

M

Lobbyists As Ammunition
The South African government-paid U.S. lobbyists are busier than ever at the
federal, state, and municipal levels. They are providing information packages
and writing speeches for their elected officials. The South African Tourist
Corporation, working hand-in-hand with the lobbyists and the South African
Foundation, is gearing up to maximize the numbers of elected officials who
will get the paid junkets to see the wonders of Kruger National Park. The
packets of literature, filmstrips, feature films and books form hundreds of full
page advertisements which are scheduled for regular appearances in major
U.S. dailies and magazines from the Phoenix Sun to the Wall Street Journal.
What is at stake in this war is South Africa's image. The very word "apartheid~'
will have to be "n~utralized," erecting in its place a vision of wild animal
parks, smiling natives, and endless sunny beaches. All in all, as part of the
total war, this image-building effort will necessitate a relentless offensive
involving the expenditure of millions and engaging hundreds coast to coast,
both South African and American.
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Prime Minister
P. W. Botha.

South Africa's Use of the U.S. Media
he Columbia Broadcasting System's show, 60 Minutes, with its 35 million
viewers weekly has already shown how the major U.S. media, especially
T
TV, can be utilized to improve South Africa's image. On December 16, 1984,
a lengthy segment hosted by Morley Safer provided a picture of Sou th Africa
which Safer himself characterized as being meant to provide only the
apartheid government's perspective. It was a show full of inaccuracies,
distortions, and incomplete facts. It showed, for instance, the extremely
comfortable houses of a few blacks, but no shots of the endless rows of squalid
cardboard and tin shacks miles from the cities where the Group Areas Act
confines urban black workers. Nowhere during the show was it mentioned
th~t in the four months before airing, over 200 black people had been shot
and killed and thousands injured in constant demonstrations and protests.
The South African government loved the the 60 Minutes segment. The
program was broadcast in total on South Africa's whites-only TV and was front
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page news. President P.W. Botha commented, "we are finally getting through
to the public abroad." When the Free South Africa Movement challenged the
show and demanded equal time to correct its false and misleading
impressions, a CBS Vice President denied the request saying, "We stand by
Mr. Safer's reporting. " 76
It is not the first time 60 Minutes has done such excellent work for the South
African apartheid machinery. On January 23, 1983, 60 Minutes aired a
forty-minute segment attacking the World Council of Churches and the
National Council of Churches, U.S.A. (NCCUSA). In a piece full of distortions
and inaccuracies, the program left uninformed viewers with the impression
that both church bodies were sending funds to guerrillas for armed struggle
and functioned as the dupes of Moscow and Havana. Like the later piece on
South Africa, it was a prime example of a one-sided piece of TV journalism.
And given that the World Council of Churches is viewed by the apartheid
government as one of its foremost enemies (after the African National
Congress), it raises the fundamental question of why CBS' 60 Minutes has
decided to be such a good "team player" on behalf of the South African
apartheid offensive.
But 60 Minutes should not be viewed as the only media player performing
for Pretoria. After a 1976 all-expenses-paid trip to South Africa, editor Beurt
SerVaas published a dozen different articles promoting South Africa in his
Saturday Evening Post, virtually turning his magazine into a pro-apartheid
vehicle. An August 1982 article in Reader's Digest which attacked the World
Council of Churches was entitled "Karl Marx or Jesus Christ: Which Master
is the WCC Serving?" and reads like a piece produced by the South African
Department of Information. So too does a March 4, 1985 editorial commentary
in Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly by Peter Brimelow. Entitled
"'Eating People is Wrong': Divestment Would Claim Many Victims in
South Africa and the U.S.," the editorial contains the usual South African
government distortions such as the glaringly misleading statement that "there
is no apartheid in the 'national states' of Venda, Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei
and the Transkei. ''
The results of a recent investigation by one journalist show that this type of
coverage may be part of a pattern. The author alleges that since 1982 "more
than 200 U.S. journalists - including some of the most powerful and
influential reporters, columnists and editors - made all-expenses paid trips
to South Africa. In almost all instances they returned to the U.S. to provide
favorable news coverage of South Africa. " 77
White South African critic and author, Donald Woods, former editor of the
Daily Dispatch newspaper in South Africa, also sees a pattern. He feels,
however, that South Africa seeks more than just "favorable" coverage. In a
report entitled, "Study and Memorandum on South African Propaganda,"
76Jan.
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Mr. Woods demonstrates decisively that the South African government seeks
"to promote a false image of South Africa's stability and reform. " 78 He points
out, for instance, that few of the bombing or sabotage actions insi9e South
Africa are even reported in the South African media, let alone in the overseas
press, TV, or radio. He also underscores the often-neglected fact that many
areas of insurgent activity are dubbed "operational zones" by the South
African security. When this happens, all media reports, both domestic and
foreign, issued from or about such a zone, must be cleared by the police. ,
When the South African government declares a state of emergency, media
coverage is so severely li.m ited that it is virtually impossible for foreign press
to cover'' Sou th Africa at all.
11

What lies ahead is that the media, especially the big municipal dailies, will
face regular challenges as to whether they will substantively share with the
American public the true details of the U.S.-South Africa story. Will they
overcome the clout which big corporate advertisers can wield in: 1) influencing
whether a story does or does not appear; 2) determining the section of the
paper in which an article appears; or 3) determining the arguments and
direction of a particular article? Another question is whether a largely white
corps of journalists covering the South African apartheid saga will be able to
transcend the racist instincts and outlooks with which they've been socialized
in the racially polarized U.S.
The probable answer to these questions is that basically the media, especially
in the Midwest and small towns, will remain captive to the corporate forces
and a "preserve the status quo" perspective. A few papers and commentators,
especially those with significant black readership and/or an organized group
of black staff, will give thorough and insightful coverage. But it will largely
be the responsibility of the _Free South Africa movement and other
anti-apartheid groups to both present the true and full picture of South African
apartheid and pressure the U.S. media machinery to do the same.
This is no small task because the impact of South Africa's apartheid system
is often only reluctantly faced by the majority of U.S. citizens. One reason is
that many Americans -believe that South Africa should take care of its own
problems. Another reason is distance and the apparent futility of the situation.
But more importantly, Americans would have to ·face up to the deep-seated
residual racism in this country as well. Currently, very few Americans will
admit that despite the 1960's civil rights movement and a larger, more visible
widely heralded black middle class, the U.S. today is still two societies, one
black (brown-Latino, yellow-Asian, and red-Native American), the other white
- two societies separate and totally unequal.
U.S. Political Right Helps South Africa
ne major source of Pretoria's new energy for the war in the U.S. is the
revival of a conservative political sector, the U.S. political right wing.
This sector's arsenal includes such publications as the American Legion
magazine, Reader's Digest, the Conservative Digest, and National Review and
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letters to the editors. It includes syndicated columnists such as Pat Buchanan,
Evans and Novak, and the organizational resolutions and votes at hundreds
of conventions and conferences allied with South Africa. It also includes such
unexpected organizations as the Boy Scouts, which has ties to apartheid South
Africa.
For example, the U.S. National Board of the Boy Scouts includes eleven
corporate directors with operations in South Africa. The list includes
luminaries like Amory Houghton, board member of both IBM, source of
computerization of South African ammunition distribution schemes and
Citicorp, world's largest single lender to South Africa, and M.T. Stamper, a
Boeing director of South African Airways. Boeings planes are used to transport
South African troops to the front in Namibia. The Boy Scouts have a branch
in Namibia actively orienting young Namibian white boys. As of 1979, the
Scouts Father in Namibia was Commandant Radmore, a full time explosives
expert and military officer with the South African Defense Forces illegally
occupying Northern Namibia and Southern Angola. 79
The support the Right provides is not limited to relatively benign transatlantic
Scouting ties. According to the Washington Office on Africa, Jeremiah Denton,
right-Wing Republican Senator from Alabama, having concluded his terrorism
hearings on the Soviet links to SWAPO and the ANC, is now allegedly
organizing a McCarthyesque fishing expedition into the U.S. anti-apartheid
movement. The clear purpose of such hearings would be to intimidate and
curtail the extensive educating and mobilizing being done by the various
anti-apartheid organizations in the U.S. 80
In November 1984, the Heritage Foundation issued a report calling for ·
increased support of the CIA and Department of Defense in order to
undermine governments in nine countries that "threaten United States
interests." Angola, the southern African country which the U.S. and ·South
Africa alone among the world's nations have refused to recognize, stands out
prominently in the report. The report underscores the importance of capturing
U.S. hearts and minds as you overthrow the government saying, "the
only hope for these limited endeavors lies in a ... more consistent U.S.
policy, which in turn must be based on a stronger public consensus
than exists today. " 81
South Africa is also aligned with another right-wing movement led by Lyndon
LaRouche which includes various manifestations: the U.S. Labor Party, the
National Caucus of Labor Committees, the National Democratic Policy
Committee, New Solidarity Newspaper, the Executive Intelligence Review, Fusion
and Campaigner Magazines, the Schiller Institute, and the Fusion Energy
Foundation. On November 15, 1984, LaRouche's group attacked and disrupted
a press conference being conducted by a group of Catholic bishops and the
79
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Washington Office on Africa. The press conference had been convened to
release a Catholic Bishops' statement condemning the South African apartheid
system and calling for more U.S. _attention to the African famine.
Such an action by Larouche was not extraordinary. During the '1970's, in
addition to physical attacks on various progressive and activ~st organizations,
the LaRouche group infilt~ated and spied on black organizations in the U.S.
and anti-apartheid organizations in both the U.S. and England. According to
articles in the New Republic magazine and the Washington Post, intelligence
reports on these groups were prepared and sold to the South African
government by LaRouche followers ~82
LaRoucne's connections and activities may mean that he is also an asset for
the Reagan administration. A lengthy series in the Washington Post on January
15. 1985 reported that LaRouche regularly contacts and briefs U.S.
governmental bodies such as the National Security Council (NSC) and the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). A comment by one former DIA director,
Daniel Graham, about how the LaRouche associates came up with "good
intelligence about the situation in Angola and Mozambique" may indicate
that LaRouche serves as a conduit for intelligence from the South African
government. 83
Violence in the U.S.
here are additional measures to which the Right in this country has
T
resorted in order to bolster the South African anti-apartheid cause: attacks
on anti-apartheid speakers in Colorado and Southern California by
mercenaries; the 1985 beating of a black divestment leader in Texas; repeated
threats on the llves of leading anti-apartheid activist Dennis Brutus, ANC
representative to the U.S. Mfanafuthi Makatini, and others; bombing threats
at the ANC and SWAPO missions to the United Nations in New York; the
1977 stabbing of American sports activist and campus professor, Richard
Lapchick, in Virginia by aHackers who carved the misspelled word "ni(g)ger"
in his stomach. Like the bombings of abortion clinics, these physical attacks
naturally are "deplored" by the Reagan administration, an administration
which embraces countries with governments such as those of South Africa
and Chile as "anti-communist friends and allies."
What The Future Holds
hat lies ahead? For the South African people? For the Southern
African region? In the U.S.? There are certain basic patterns and/
dynamics which can be abstracted from the situation of intense and rapid
change. As a recent clandestine radio broadcast of the ANC characterized the
situation in South Africa, "Events in our country are moving with astonishing
speed. The face of the country is changing before our very eyes."
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One pattern is that the South African government and its corporate allies are
devoting more and more resources to the image war in the U.S. even as South
Africa maximizes and diversifies its means of waging war and repression in
Southern Africa. There is a veritable landslide of articles, TY, and radio
coverage celebrating the reforms inside South Africa, such as the recent
constitutional changes which gave Asians the vote but excluded the black
majority. A type of limited home rule for the black townships is being widely
projected. Both the U.S. and South African machinery will increasingly focus
on South African urban blacks. One important Reagan administration
response may be to bring many more black South Africans to the U.S. to
study while those black South African refugees who have been here for years
go destitute because the U.S. government cut off many of their educational
scholarships and other forms of support.
Meanwhile, the small group of black businessmen inside South Africa will
be given broader and broader public relations coverage. This will be part of
a strategy aimed at siphoning off some leadership of the black community
and fortifying that group as a strata of blacks supportive of the government
and the status quo situation. This strategy includes, but is not limited to, the
following:
• Stricter laws will be introduced regulating the
flow of African labor into white (or "urban")
areas. The government-appointed Reickert
Commission outlined the strategy as early as May
1979, when it said that the basic goal would be
more (and better) control of "employment,"
"accommodation," the "rights" and living of the
African population. 84
• The bantustan governments will be lauded as
independent black governments which are
peacefully solving the problems of multi-racial
coexistence.
• Black "development" projects will be paraded
before the U.S. public as places for investment.
• The bantustan "leaders" like Kaiser Matanzima
and other government-appointed officials like
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi with his Inkatha
movement may be brought to Washington and
other major cities as part of a general effort to
identify and project alternative black leadership
to ANC leadership.
Those developments will occur even as the South African government
enhances the capacities of the same bantustans' police and military forces to
rule by violence, to wreak repression and havoc on the populations already
suffering in those barren lands. This strategy has already begun. In the Ciskei,
in 1983-1984, hundreds of people, mostly youth and students, were regularly
rounded up and systematically tortured in the Sisa Dukashe stadium.
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n the U.S., there will be a renewed effort by the government, as well as
corporate, and university administrative elite to placate an American public
which steadily becomes more informed and agitated about South Africa. Some
type of legislation might be passed which will attempt to curtail the sale of
Kruggerands, ban bank loans to the South African government, and limit
future investment. But such legislation would have to be of minimal
effectiveness in order to gain the wide House and Senate support that it will
need to override an almost certain Reagan veto.

I

The corporate community will up the ante. It will respond to the growing
clamor by a more consciencized and aroused public, especially from the black
and student communities, against the role of U.S. corporations in supporting
the South African government. At the center of the debate will be the famous
Sullivan Principles, tailored by black preacher and General Motors Board
Director, Leon Sullivan, which call for desegregated work places, equal pay,
training programs for blacks, supervisory positions for blacks, improved living
conditions outside the workplace, and the working of signatory companies
to end apartheid and recognize black trade unions. These principles will be
more widely projected and urged as the alternative to what will be dubbed
"the radical options," such as divestment and/or U.S. corporate withdrawal
from South Africa.
'
What will not be discussed about the Sullivan Principles is that U.S. companies
in South Africa, given their highly mechanized, computerized operations,
employ less that one percent of the South African labor force and that less
than one-half of the U.S. companies have signed onto the principles. Further,
only one-third of those companies who follow the principles have received
passing grades for their implementation efforts by the monitoring company,
Arthur D. Little, which also has operations in South Africa. 85 The
corporations, as they talk to the U.S. Congress, city and st~te legislatures,
unions, churches, and others will also neglect to mention that many of the
same companies lauding their role as Sullivan signatory companies spend
hundreds of thousands of dollars in union-busting efforts and in fighting
affirmative action principles for minorities and women in the U.S. Finally, the
supporters of the Sullivan Principles will fail to point out that the call for an
end to U.S. corporate presence has come most persistently from individuals
and organizations inside South Africa despite the fact that advocating for
divestment and withdrawal of foreign corporations or capital is a criminal
offense under the South African Terrorism Act and potentially punishable by
imprisonment or death. Little quoted will be what the Motor Assemblers and
Component Workers Union of South Africa (MACWUSA) representing
workers at Ford Motor Company's Port Elizabeth Factory had to say about
the Sullivan Principles in 1982. They called the Sullivan Principles Code "a
toothless package of piecemeal reform that allows this cruel system of
. 1186
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oth South African Nobel Peace Prize winners, Chief Albert Luthuli and
Bishop Tutu, as well as Nobel recipient Dr. Martin Luther King, have
B
called for corporate withdrawal from South Africa as a means of non-violent
pressure on the apartheid government. Also among those who have called
for corporate withdrawal are organizations like the African National Congress,
the banned Christian Institute, various black consciousness organizations,
and individuals like Steve Biko, Dr. Neil Aggett, and Nelson and Winnie
Mandela. In 1984, the largest federation of trade unions in South Africa, the
Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) had this to say about
disinvestment:
FOSATU as a trade union organization concerned
with the jobs and livelihood of its members has to
give careful consideration to the question of
disinvestment. However, it is FOSATU's
considered view that the pressure for disinvestment has had a positive effect and should therefore
not be lessened. FOSATU is definitely opposed to
foreign investment that accepts the conditions of
oppression maintained by this regime. 87
In early July 1985, the South African Council of Churches (SACC) officially
decided that, despite the possibility of being prosecuted for treason, the time
had come to issue a call for economic pressure on South Africa, including
disinvestment. 88
In November, 1985, the newly-formed Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU) held its formative convention. With 558,000 members, it began its
political life as a trade union federation by going on the offensive and adopting
militant and openly political positions. The founding conference declared its
support for divestment and sanctions as "an essential and effective form of
pressure on the regime that must be supported." The President of COSATU
sent a special message to the British and U.S. governments ·saying:
They tell us they are against divestment because
the black people would starve, but black people
have been starving here since the first white settlers.
arrived in 1652. 89
In terms of the Southern African region, there are certain patterns, too, which
can be discerned. The treaty called the Nkomati Accords, forced on
Mozambique by both South Africa and the U.S. in March 1984- one pledging
Mozambique to cease support for the ANC and South Africa to terminate its
support to the group fighting the Mozambiquan government, the MNR-is
widely advertised, especially by the U.S. as a model, the path to a resolution
of the Southern African conflict. This velvet glove initiative is being taken,
even as both South Africa, and to a lesser extent the U.S., increase their "iron
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fist" amounts of covert aid to the MNR in Mozambique and to UNITA in
Angola in order for them to continue their military efforts to subvert the
economies and terrorize the civilian populations. From the 1970's to July 1985,
this covert aid from the U.S. was secretly forwarded along witp official
expressions of "concern about the actions of the MNR and UNITA
guerrillas." 90 But on July 12, 1985, even as the U.S. Senate was voting limited
but history-making sanctions against South Africa, the gloves came off. The
U.S. House of Representatives passed a foreign aid bill containing a provision
to lift the Clark Amendment's nine-year ban on American support to UNITA
in Angola thus paving the way for the U.5. to assume a more active role in
shaping events in Southern Africa. As Congressman Henry Hyde,
conservative Republican from Illinois, said,
Cancelling the (Clark) amendment was like taking
a cast off a broken leg. It shows we're no longer
paralyzed by Vietnam-guilt legislation. 91
he U.S. can easily move both to sanction South Africa with one hand and
proffer more support to one of South Africa's main allies with the other.
There is no contradiction. For the U.S. and South Africans have twin objectives
and ~gendas for Southern Africa. Both countries always come together when
it comes to fighting communism. And the U.S. government has a history of
linking with any force which will help preserve U.S. interests and global
hegemony. The U.S. would like to see the Cubans out of Angola, a new or
an accommodated Mozambiquan government, and an organization other than
the ANC and SWAPO come to power in South Africa and Namibia. Pretoria's
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agenda is to indefinitely postpone a SWAPO victory in Namibia, and above
all else, to prevent the ANC from gaining power in South Africa.
At the moment, the governments of both the U.S. and South Africa have
reason to be worried. It is understandable that both must step up their various
wars both in South Africa, Southern Africa, and abroad. Never before has
the apartheid regime been under such a serious threat to its very existence
as today. The growing demonstrations in U.S. cities and elsewhere, the
passage of an anti-apartheid bill by the U.S. Congress, the massive support
inside the country for the ANC and its related bodies, the continuing armed
acts of sabotage and attacks on the installations and symbols of apartheid,
the two day work stoppage by over 1,000,000 workers in Johannesburg
November 5 and 6th, 1984, the call in late June, 1985 by the ANC for a total
uprising inside South Africa, all demonstrate momentous numbers of
organized people worldwide participating in organized actions aimed at a
single clear and shared objective: the ending of the apartheid state.
The history of the African continent's freedom struggles show that setbacks
and reversals are part of the road. The U.S. Congress may not, for example,
impose meaningful economic sanctions on South Africa. Those struggling
inside South Africa will be disappointed but not defeated by this. More and
more people inside South Africa will be detained, arrested, or meet death in
the hands of the authorities. Inside South Africa, people accept this as a part
of their daily reality. The movement to "make South Africa ungovernable and
apartheid unworkable" and "to establish peoples' power" as called for by the
ANC's President, OliverTambo is one in which there are necessarily defections
and splits. Some people weaken. Some remain strong. This, too, people
struggling "inside" have come to accept. People there accept that there is a
long and difficult road ahead which few of them will completely traverse. As
Beyers Naude, former Dutch Reformed Church clergyman and foday the
Secretary-General of the SACC, put it in a January 1985 Dutch newspaper,
Trouw, "I do not know when the time of liberation in South Africa will come,
but I do know that when the time comes it will be clear where I shall stand
and for what I am prepared to give my life .... " 92 For the single inevitable fact
about South Africa remains that, as an ANC representative put it:
South Africa is like a man who owned a house
beseiged by a cyclone. When he closed the front
door, the wind blew in the back. When he shut the
windows, the roof blew off. And when he tried to
build a temporary covering, the walls caved in. 93
The cyclone is blowing too in the United States and it affects us all.
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